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TAX ABUSE-LESSONS FROM ABROAD
Orly Sulami*
ABSTRACT
How does a government distinguish between tax planning and tax
abuse? Most democratic societies agree that citizens have a right to limit
their tax liability through tax planning. But governments generally also
agree that this right does not extend to tax abuse. Tax abuse substantially
reduces government tax revenues and weakens the integrity of our tax sys-
tem and the efficiency of our economy. Thus, distinguishing between tax
planning and tax abuse is critical. In an attempt to identify and counter tax
abuse and its detrimental effects, the United States recently enacted an anti-
abuse rule in Section 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code. Because tax
abuse is difficult to legislatively define, Section 7701 (o) relies heavily on the
judiciary to make the ultimate determination of which transactions are abu-
sive. This article contends that the international experience with similar
general anti-avoidance rules indicates that Section 7701(o) will not be a
universal cure for tax abuse but can be an effective anti-abuse tool if certain
judicial, legislative, and administrative steps are taken. Therefore, it pro-
poses a reform to Section 7701(o) that would counter the textualist trend
and other judicial approaches that potentially undermine the statute while
simultaneously increasing the statute's fairness and predictability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
ARLOS Sala was fortunate enough to realize over $60 million in
income during the tax year. But with this income came a signifi-
cant tax liability.1 Thus, as many taxpayers do, Sala engaged in
tax planning to minimize his tax liability.2 For Sala, this involved partici-
pating in an investment program that promised to generate over a $60
million tax loss, without Sala incurring any corresponding financial loss. 3
Through this investment, Sala completely eliminated his federal income
tax liability.4 The investment complied with the literal language of the
relevant Internal Revenue Code provision and did not involve any illegal
means to obtain the tax benefit.5 However, Sala should have thought
twice about entering into this transaction. The Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit deemed this transaction to be abusive.6
Recently enacted anti-abuse legislation has given the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue a powerful weapon to counteract transactions, like
Sala's investment, that obtain inappropriate tax benefits. 7 Even though a




5. Id. at 1253-54.
6. Id. at 1255.
7. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067 (codified at I.R.C. § 7701(o) (Supp. 2010)). Sala engaged in
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taxpayer does not engage in tax evasion and technically complies with the
statutory text, the Commissioner may deem the transaction abusive. And
if the IRS or the courts determine that a transaction crosses the line from
tax planning to tax abuse, taxpayers are now subject to severe penalties of
up to 40% on the underpayment of tax attributable to the tax abusive
transaction. 8
Tax abuse 9 generally exists when a taxpayer obtains tax benefits from a
transaction that complies with the statute's literal text but circumvents
the statute's intended purpose. Although most democratic societies
agree that taxpayers have a right to engage in acceptable tax planning to
minimize their tax liability, they also agree that this right does not extend
to tax abusive transactions.10 Tax abuse that is left unchecked acts as a
"fiscal and moral termite[ I."' It eats away at government tax revenues,
the integrity of our tax systems, and the efficiency of our economies.'
2
Thus, despite the difficulties in precisely defining tax abuse, it is critical
for governments to find a way to distinguish these abusive transactions
from legitimate tax planning.
Many countries, from China to New Zealand, have enacted a statutory
general anti-avoidance rule (commonly referred to as a "GAAR") to tar-
get tax abuse and differentiate it from acceptable tax planning. t 3 After
years of debate, on March 30, 2010, Congress enacted the United States'
own version of a GAAR as part of the Health Care and Education Rec-
the transaction prior to the enactment of this legislation. Therefore, Sala's investment was
deemed abusive under the common law version of Section 7701(o), referred to as the eco-
nomic substance doctrine, rather than Section 7701(o). Sala, 613 F.3d at 1255.
8. Although Sala was subject to penalties attributable to his understatement of tax,
the 40% penalty did not apply to his tax abusive transaction because the legislation impos-
ing this penalty came into effect after Sala entered into the transaction. Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1409(b), (c)(1).
9. Tax abuse is often also referred to as abusive tax avoidance transactions, tax abu-
sive transactions, or tax shelters, and these terms are used interchangeably throughout this
Article.
10. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) ("Any one may so
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes."), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE, DISCUSSION PA-
PER ON TAX AVOIDANCE AND SECTION 103 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1962 (ACT No. 58
OF 1962), at 15 (2005) [hereinafter SARS] (noting that this principle "is not to be denied"
and that it can be "found in democratic societies throughout the world").
11. See Chris Evans, Containing Tax Avoidance: Anti-Avoidance Strategies 3 (Univ. of
N.S.W. Faculty of Law Research Series, Working Paper No. 40, 2008).
12. SARS, supra note 10, at 9-15. See also Joseph Bankman, The Economic Substance
Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 22 (2000) (explaining the lost tax revenue and intangible
costs of tax shelters); Evans, supra note 11, at 3 (describing how abusive tax avoidance
transactions have caused tax revenues to diminish across the world); Laura J. Kreissl &
Karyn B. Friske, IRS Scores Recent Judicial Successes Against Tax Shelters, 81 PRAC. TAX
STRATEGIES 338, 338 (2008) (stating that it is estimated that offshore tax abuses cost
American taxpayers $100 billion a year).
13. Many developed countries have a statutory GAAR, including Australia, Canada,
China, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Spain,
South Africa, and Sweden. Additionally, India has a proposed GAAR, which became ef-




onciliation Act of 2010.14 This law codifies the economic substance doc-
trine in Section 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.15 The
economic substance doctrine is an anti-avoidance rule created by the
courts to disallow tax benefits otherwise permitted under a literal reading
of the tax provisions. Pursuant to Section 7701(o), the Commissioner
may invalidate the tax benefits arising from an arrangement that lacks a
meaningful economic effect or a substantial non-tax purpose. 16
The enactment of this GAAR-like statute will undoubtedly intensify an
already heated debate over the proper role of a general anti-avoidance
rule in the United States' fight against tax abuse. Prior to codification of
the economic substance doctrine, substantial scholarship was written on
the benefits and drawbacks of enacting a GAAR in the United States.1 7
Current debates about the new law tend to focus on the changes, or lack
thereof, brought by Section 7701(o), as well as the merits of alternative
anti-abuse measures.1 8 However, most of the scholarship has neither
14. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067. While Section 7701 is not technically a GAAR, its purpose
and operation is quite similar to that of a GAAR. See infra Part III.B.
15. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1409(a).
16. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (Supp. 2010). The statute also provides that a state or local
income tax effect, which is related to a federal income tax effect, will be treated in the same
manner as a federal income tax effect. Id. § 7701(o)(3). Individuals engaging in personal
transactions are exempt from Section 7701(o). An individual is only subject to the statute's
provisions if that individual entered into a transaction in connection with a trade or busi-
ness or an activity engaged in for the production of income. Id. § 7701(o)(5)(B).
17. See, e.g., Graeme S. Cooper, International Experience with General Anti-Avoid-
ance Rules, 54 SMU L. REV. 83 (2001) (arguing that the international experience with
GAARs shows that a GAAR can play a useful role in countering tax avoidance although it
does not completely solve the tax abuse problem); Jerome B. Libin, Congress Should Ad-
dress Tax Avoidance Head-On: The Internal Revenue Code Needs a GAAR, 30 VA. TAX
REV. 339 (2010) (discussing how the United States needs to confront tax avoidance directly
through the use of a general anti-abuse rule); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Beyond a GAAR:
Retrofitting the Code to Rein in 21st Century Tax Shelters, 98 TAX NOTES 1721 (2003) (sup-
porting proposals to codify the economic substance doctrine and defending such proposals
from criticisms); Aviv Pichhadze & Amir Pichhadze, Economic Substance Doctrine: Time
for a Legislative Response, 48 TAX NOTES INT'L 61 (2007) (contending that Congress
should enact anti-abuse legislation in the United States because the judicial trend under-
mines judicial anti-abuse rules); Samuel C. Thompson, Jr. & Robert A. Clary II, Coming in
from the 'Cold': The Case for ESD Codification, 99 TAX NOTES 1270 (2003) (explaining
how codifying the economic substance doctrine in the United States would give the IRS a
more effective tool for fighting against tax abuse); Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Save the Economic
Substance Doctrine from Congress, 118 TAX NOTES 1405 (2008) (discussing why a judicial
anti-abuse rule is preferable to a statutory one in the United States and arguing that codifi-
cation of the economic substance doctrine is a terrible idea).
18. See, e.g., Richard M. Lipton, 'Codification' of the Economic Substance Doctrine-
Much Ado About Nothing?, 112 J. TAX'N 324 (2010) (explaining how most traditional tax
planning will not be affected by the addition of Section 7701(o) to the Internal Revenue
Code); Allen D. Madison, Rationalizing Tax Law by Breaking the Addiction to Economic
Substance, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 441 (2011) (critiquing the economic substance doctrine and
recommending a risk requirement as an alternative to the economic substance doctrine);
Bret Wells, Economic Substance Doctrine: How Codification Changes Decided Cases, 10
FLA. TAX REV. 411 (2010) (analyzing several historical court decisions in light of Section
7701(o) to illustrate how tax jurisprudence may be impacted as a result of the new law);
Martin J. McMahon Jr., Living with (and Dying by) the Codified Economic Substance Doc-
trine (Univ. of Fla. Levin Coll. of Law, Research Paper No. 2010-13, 2010) (discussing the
minimal changes made by the new law other than with respect to the penalty provisions).
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evaluated whether the newly enacted legislation will operate successfully
in the United States nor considered how to improve the statute that has
been enacted. This Article fills a gap in the literature by identifying and
examining Section 7701(o) and the judicial approaches historically taken
in the United States to predict whether Section 7701(o) will serve as an
effective anti-abuse measure. This Article contends that although Section
7701(o) is not a universal cure for tax abuse, it can be used to successfully
identify and counter abusive tax schemes if certain congressional steps
are taken. This Article makes several points to support this argument.
First, this Article explains how Section 7701(o) is comparable to a
GAAR. Specifically, Section 7701(o), like other GAARs, is a statutory
provision targeted at preventing general tax avoidance. Its purpose and
operation are both considerably similar to that of a GAAR in other com-
mon law countries.19
Second, this Article illustrates how the international experience with a
GAAR provides a number of lessons for the U.S. debate. 20 Specifically,
the tax avoidance jurisprudence in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
provides meaningful insight into judicial approaches that can undermine,
as well as strengthen, our newly enacted Section 7701(o).21 These coun-
tries, like the United States, are common law jurisdictions that have
GAARs with similar features to Section 7701(o). Canada's proximity to
the United States, its role as our largest trading partner, and its similar
laws and culture make the lessons that emerge from the Canadian experi-
ence with a GAAR particularly relevant to the new U.S. law. Moreover,
Australia's and New Zealand's long experiences with GAARs shed light
on judicial approaches that cause tax abuse to flourish, as well as ap-
proaches that cause tax abuse to diminish.
The international experience also reveals that judiciaries that support
the Duke of Westminster principle generally adopt judicial approaches
that undermine a GAAR's effectiveness. The Duke of Westminster prin-
ciple emphasizes a taxpayer's right to arrange his or her affairs in any
manner that complies with a statute's literal requirements.22 Accord-
ingly, courts endorsing this principle employ a literalist interpretation of
statutes and often refuse to consider a lack of economic substance, as well
as other indicia of tax avoidance, as relevant factors in the tax abuse anal-
ysis. In addition, these courts may place an unreasonably high burden of
proof on the government in tax abuse cases to protect a taxpayer's right
to engage in tax planning. This often results in the GAAR applying to
counteract abusive tax avoidance transactions in obvious cases, but not
applying when the legislative intent with respect to a specific provision is
19. See infra Part III.B.; John Prebble, Prebble Welcomes the US Treasury and IRS to
the Ranks of GAAR-Empowered Fiscs, TAX PROF BLOG (2010), http://taxprof.typepad.
com/files/prebble.pdf.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. Although the British experience with a particular law generally provides helpful
insight into a new U.S. law, the United Kingdom does not currently have a GAAR.
22. See Inland Revenue Comm'r v. Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. 1 (H.L.) (U.K.).
2012]
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not as clear.23 On the other hand, tax abusive transactions are more
likely caught within the scope of a GAAR when courts purposively inter-
pret statutes, consider economic substance and other factors in their tax
abuse analysis, place reasonable burdens of proof on the parties, and dis-
aggregate abusive transactions from legitimate arrangements. 24
Third, this Article demonstrates that while Congress may need to
amend Section 7701(o) in the future, Section 7701(o) can be an effective
weapon against tax abuse in the United States. 25 American courts have
adopted many of the judicial approaches in the tax abuse context that
have strengthened GAARs abroad. Specifically, U.S. courts reject the
Duke of Westminster principle, consider economic substance and other
tax avoidance indicia as relevant to the tax abuse analysis, do not place an
oppressive burden on the government to prove tax abuse, and separately
consider tax abusive transactions even when they are hidden in accept-
able business arrangements.
However, the United States has also taken several approaches that po-
tentially undermine Section 7701(o)'s effectiveness. Specifically, U.S.
courts have increasingly used a textualist method of statutory interpreta-
tion in tax abuse cases and emphasize a taxpayer's subjective motives in
entering into the arrangement. The Canadian, Australian, and New Zea-
land experiences illustrate that these approaches often emasculate a
GAAR. Thus, this Article suggests legislative and administrative re-
sponses that can be taken to ensure the success of Section 7701(o). This
Article proposes that Congress should amend Section 7701(o) to explic-
itly require courts to consider congressional intent in their tax abuse anal-
ysis, as well as to require courts to consider objective, rather than
subjective, evidence of the arrangement's purpose. These changes would
make Section 7701(o) a more effective anti-abuse measure and also in-
crease the statute's fairness and predictability.
The remainder of this Article expands upon these arguments. Follow-
ing this Introduction, Part II explores the difficulty in distinguishing tax
abuse from acceptable tax planning and will demonstrate that some form
of general anti-avoidance rule is necessary to identify and counteract tax
abuse. Part III explains that the addition of Section 7701(o) to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code represents the introduction of a statutory GAAR in
the United States. It describes the similarities between the statutory pro-
visions of Section 7701(o) and the GAARs currently in force in Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand. Part IV analyzes the implications of the tax
avoidance jurisprudence in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand on the
effectiveness of each country's GAAR as an anti-avoidance measure.
This Article argues that courts that fail to (i) purposively interpret stat-
23. See infra Part IV; Brian Arnold, The Canadian Experience with a General Anti-
Avoidance Rule, in BEYOND BOUNDARIES: DEVELOPING APPROACHES TO TAX AVOID-
ANCE AND TAX RISK MANAGEMENT 29, 32 (Judith Freedman ed., 2008); Susan Van Der
Hout, Good News for Taxpayers on Canadian GAAR, 15 J. INT'L TAX'N 44, 46 (2004).
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part V.
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utes, (ii) consider economic substance and other objective factors as part
of the tax abuse analysis, (iii) disaggregate abusive steps from the overall
business arrangement, and (iv) place a reasonable burden of proof on the
parties undermine a GAAR's effectiveness, while courts that adopt these
approaches often strengthen a GAAR. Part V contends that Section
7701(o) will likely prove to be an effective weapon in the United States
against tax abuse, but that Congress may need to amend Section 7701(o)
in the future to ensure its success.
II. WHAT IS TAX ABUSE?
A fundamental difficulty governments face is how to distinguish be-
tween legitimate tax planning and tax abuse. 26 A significant reason for
this difficulty is that tax abusive transactions are both situational and dy-
namic, which makes them difficult to precisely define.2 7 But making this
distinction between legitimate tax planning and abusive tax avoidance is
critical.
Numerous studies have identified significant tangible and intangible
costs that tax shelters cause. 28 These studies emphasize that tax abuse is
detrimental to the operation of governments because it reduces a govern-
ment's revenue collections and consequently weakens the government's
ability to set and implement national economic policy.2 9 Additionally,
transactions that claim inappropriate tax benefits breed disrespect for the
tax system and the law, which increases non-compliance. 30 Tax abusive
transactions also unfairly shift the tax burden, distort economic behavior
by diverting resources from more productive ventures, and result in in-
creasingly complex laws as the government struggles to counteract spe-
cific abusive transactions. 31 Given these detrimental consequences, most
commentators agree that even though there is no universal definition of
"tax abuse," it is a persistent problem that needs to be addressed.32 In an
26. Leandra Lederman, W(h)ither Economic Substance?, 95 IowA L. REV. 389,394-95
(2010) (explaining that it is difficult to identify the line between acceptable tax planning
and tax abuse, because different tax statutes have different goals: the goal of some tax
statutes is to measure income, while the goal of other tax statutes is to induce a desired
behavior).
27. Evans, supra note 11, at 5; Madison, supra note 18, at 464; Eugen Trombitas, The
Conceptual Approach to Tax Avoidance in the 21st Century: When the Statute Gives but the
GAAR Can Take Away, 15 N.Z. J. TAX'N L. & POL'Y 352, 353 (2009).
28. See, e.g., SARS, supra note 10, at 9-15 (describing the detrimental effects of abu-
sive tax avoidance transactions in a study conducted by the South African Revenue Ser-
vice); DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE TAX SHELTERS:
DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (1999); Kreissl & Friske, supra note
12, at 338 (stating that it is "estimated that offshore tax abuses cost American taxpayers
$100 billion a year").
29. SARS, supra note 10, at 9-15.
30. Id. at 10.
31. Id. at 11-15.
32. See, e.g., Lederman, supra note 26, at 391-92 (stating that tax abuse is a perennial
problem that needs to be solved and suggesting that courts can help counteract such trans-
actions by considering whether the claimed tax benefit is consistent with the intent of the
applicable provisions); Charlene Luke, What Would Henry Simons Do?: Using an Ideal to
2012]
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attempt to identify and counter such tax abuses, countries worldwide
have enacted specific and general anti-abuse legislation.
A. THE DIFFICULTY OF DEFINING TAX ABUSE
Tax abuse, like tax evasion, is a method taxpayers use to minimize or
eliminate their tax liability. Despite similar tax-minimization goals, abu-
sive tax avoidance transactions are easily distinguishable from tax eva-
sion. Tax evasion involves the deliberate breach of the tax law through
fraud, concealment, or other illegal measures so that a taxpayer can avoid
paying its true tax liability.33 Most nations view tax evasion as a serious
offense and have enacted laws that clearly define and prohibit tax evasion
activities.
On the other hand, tax abuse does not involve the use of illegal mea-
sures to create tax benefits. Instead, tax abuse generally exists when a
taxpayer reduces its tax liability by ordering its affairs in a manner that
complies with the text of the statute but contradicts the intent of the law
it purports to follow. 34 Taxpayers engaging in tax abusive transactions
often lower their tax liability by manipulating "inconsistencies" and "dis-
continuities" inherent in national tax systems and across international
borders.35 Abusive tax schemes take advantage of gaps in the tax system,
exploit or abuse tax relief provisions, create tax advantages through off-
shore schemes, and use statutory provisions designed to prevent tax
avoidance in a manner that generates tax benefits, often at the expense of
the government. 36
Despite this broad definition, tax abuse is fact-specific and difficult to
precisely define.37 Moreover, most democratic societies recognize a tax-
payer's right to engage in tax planning to minimize his or her tax liability
within the bounds of the law. 38 Thus, governments often struggle with
Shape and Explain the Economic Substance Doctrine, 11 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 108, 109
(2011) (stating that there is not yet any consensus on which transactions should be labeled
as tax shelters). A significant amount of scholarship exists on how to effectively counteract
tax abuse, which further highlights scholars' consensus that tax abuse needs to be ade-
quately minimized. See, e.g., Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters
and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1955 (2005) (proposing a
statutory solution to the tax-shelter problem, which is based on a general disallowance of
non-economic losses); Libin, supra note 17, at 351 (arguing that the United States needs to
confront tax avoidance directly through legislative changes to prevent taxpayers from re-
ducing their federal income tax burden inappropriately).
33. SARS, supra note 10, at 2-3. Common examples of tax evasion include the delib-
erate failure to file a tax return or to report all taxable income, the deliberate claim of a
deduction for a non-existent expense, or concealing or falsifying other relevant informa-
tion. Id. at 3.
34. Evans, supra note 11, at 4.
35. Id. at 6-7.
36. Id. at 7-8.
37. Id. at 9; Trombitas, supra note 27, at 353.
38. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934) ("Any one may so
arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as low as possible; he is not bound to choose that
pattern which will best pay the Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's
taxes."), afTd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); SARS, supra note 10, at 15 (noting this principle is not
to be denied and is a principle found in democratic societies throughout the world).
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the tension between permitting taxpayers to engage in legitimate tax-min-
imizing activities and protecting the tax system from abuse.39 This ten-
sion has caused the line delineating tax abuse from acceptable tax
planning to be an unclear and moving target. 40
B. THE HALLMARKS OF TAX ABUSE
Even though tax abuse may be difficult to precisely define, these trans-
actions often share common attributes.4 1 One key feature that many abu-
sive tax avoidance schemes exhibit is a lack of economic substance.
4 2
While a "real" transaction has as its origin and purpose to make money
by increasing profits with the return on investment related to the risk
involved, abusive tax avoidance schemes characteristically have little or
no business, commercial, or non-tax drivers.43 Additionally, taxpayers
engaged in abusive tax avoidance schemes often have little or no eco-
nomic risk. 44 Accordingly, these transactions also offer little or no oppor-
tunity for pre-tax gain.45
So why would a rational investor enter into a transaction that has very
little, if any, potential for profit? The answer is in the tax benefits that
abusive tax avoidance transactions offer. Instead of offering pre-tax
gains, abusive tax avoidance transactions offer "returns" on the invest-
ment in the form of tax benefits. 46 These tax benefits create an attractive
after-tax profit, which makes these transactions profitable for many
investors.4 7
Taxpayers often also benefit on their financial statements from abusive
tax avoidance arrangements. 48 These transactions regularly create a mis-
match between the legal form or accounting treatment of the transaction
and its economic substance. 49 This mismatch often results in an inconsis-
tent treatment for tax and financial accounting purposes, which is gener-
39. Chris Evans, Barriers to Avoidance: Recent Legislative and Judicial Developments
in Common Law Jurisdictions, 37 H.K. L.J. 103, 106-07 (2007).
40. Id. at 106 (stating the boundary line between tax abuse and tax planning "will
inevitably change in the light of ever-changing social, legal and economic circumstances").
41. SARS, supra note 10, at 19 (noting a growing recognition that many of the most
abusive tax avoidance schemes share common characteristics); Evans, supra note 11, at 15
(describing similar indicia of tax avoidance created by the Anti-Avoidance Group of Her
Majesty's Revenues and Customs in the United Kingdom). Various schemes may have
some, but not all, of these badges of tax avoidance. SARS, supra note 10, at 19.
42. SARS, supra note 10, at 20; STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-18-
10, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE "RECONCILIATION
ACT OF 2010," As AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT" 142-43 (2010).
43. SARS, supra note 10, at 20; Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner's Perspective on
Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Business Transactions and in Tax
Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 52 (2001); Evans, supra note 11, at 8.
44. SARS, supra note 10, at 20.
45. Id.
46. Id. Therefore, a significant investment often appears illusory and the taxpayer re-
mains insulated from nearly all of the economic risk. Id.
47. Id.




ally to the taxpayer's advantage.50 In addition, tax shelters often also
include involvement by taxpayers outside of their normal areas of exper-
tise, the use of new, complex financial instruments, or the use of tax ha-
ven arrangements.5 1
Many tax abusive schemes are complex transactions with high transac-
tion costs.5 2 To generate the desired result and to disguise the true nature
of the scheme, these transactions often require numerous contrived, arti-
ficial, preordained, or economically unnecessary steps.5 3 Abusive tax
avoidance transactions may also involve the use of tax-indifferent parties
or special purpose entities to achieve the desired tax benefit, which fur-
ther increases the transaction's complexity and costs. 5 4
C. THE ATTEMPT TO LEGISLATIVELY DEFINE TAX ABUSE
Despite the common indicia of tax abuse, defining tax abuse ultimately
depends on the particular facts and circumstances involved.5 5 In an at-
tempt to define and minimize tax abuse, governments often enact specific
anti-avoidance rules. Unfortunately, specific anti-avoidance rules cannot
legislatively define the almost infinite tax abusive transactions that may
arise.
Specific anti-avoidance rules are narrowly drafted tax provisions that
target particular areas where abuse has been identified.5 6 These rules
legislatively define tax abuse by specifying particular transactions that are
prohibited or certain conditions that must be met for a transaction to be
respected.5 7 Most taxpayers and tax practitioners who engage in tax
planning have come across these rules. For instance, specific anti-avoid-
ance rules that commonly apply in the international tax planning context
include the controlled foreign company rules, transfer pricing rules, and
thin capitalization rules.
Even though specific anti-avoidance rules have the advantage of preci-
sion and offer taxpayers predictability, specific anti-avoidance measures
alone can never solve the tax abuse problem.5 8 It is not feasible, as well
as highly inefficient, for legislatures to enact specific rules to target all
50. Id.
51. Id. at 25-27.
52. Id. at 24.
53. Id. at 21-22; Evans, supra note 11, at 10; Comm'r of Inland Revenue v Penny
[2010] 3 NZLR 360, para [110] (CA) (N.Z.), affd, [2012] 1 NZLR 433 (SC).
54. For instance, tax shelters often utilize foreign persons, partnerships, pension funds,
and taxpayers that can generate offsetting deductions, such as net operating losses. SARS,
supra note 10, at 21. Fees are not only paid to these tax-indifferent parties, but are often
also paid to the scheme promoters, which further increases the transaction's costs. See id.
at 24.
55. Evans, supra note 11, at 9.
56. Id. at 21. For example, the United Kingdom has been "among the more prolific of
the common law jurisdictions in introducing new specific anti-avoidance measures in re-
cent years." Id. at 23. The United States' complex Code is also filled with countless spe-
cific rules targeted at preventing certain tax abuses.
57. Id. at 21-22.
58. SARS, supra note 10, at 47.
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forms of tax abusive activities.59 Because a government generally enacts
specific anti-avoidance rules only after it identifies a new tax scheme, spe-
cific anti-abuse rules tend to be reactive in nature. 60 Thus, many taxpay-
ers are able to benefit from the particular scheme during the time it takes
the government to identify and enact rules to target that scheme.61
Moreover, these rules often become ineffective with time as taxpayers
devise new schemes to circumvent the specific anti-avoidance rules or to
use the rules to their advantage. 62 Specific anti-abuse rules, which are
detailed provisions, also add complexity to already complex tax
systems. 63
Because of the deficiencies inherent in specific anti-abuse rules, some
discretion must be left to the judges in making the ultimate determination
of which transactions are tax abusive. This is often achieved through the
enactment of a GAAR. A GAAR is a statutory general anti-avoidance
rule that broadly defines tax abuse but leaves the ultimate determination
of tax abuse to the courts.
The enactment of a GAAR reflects the basic recognition that even the
best drafted tax legislation cannot foresee every future situation that may
develop or every scheme that may be created in response to it.64 A
GAAR seeks to protect the income tax liability established under other
provisions of the tax legislation by generally prohibiting transactions that
claim a tax benefit in an abusive manner. 65 The broad anti-abuse focus of
this measure helps avoid the endless reactionary cycle produced by spe-
cific tax measures. 66 The broad nature of modern GAARs also inher-
ently provides the judiciary with significant discretion in applying and
interpreting the GAAR.67 Thus, the ultimate meaning of tax abuse de-
pends significantly on how courts interpret and apply a GAAR in their
decisions.
III. ELEMENTS OF A GAAR IN THE UNITED STATES
AND ABROAD
A GAAR is not a new phenomenon. Australia and New Zealand have
long histories of GAARs, which have served as the framework for the
GAARs of other countries. 68 In 1985, the Canadian Parliament enacted
59. See id. (observing that specific anti-avoidance rules are insufficient to fight tax
avoidance alone because of the inherent "discontinuities" that exist in any tax system, to-
gether with an almost endless supply of new financial instruments).
60. See DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 28, at xiii.
61. See id.
62. See SARS, supra note 10, at 6-7, 25.
63. Id. at 11.
64. Id. at 6-7.
65. Id. at 6.
66. See Cooper, supra note 17, at 128 (proposing that a GAAR may effectively
counteract self-generated tax ploys and aggressively marketed externally developed
schemes sold to taxpayers).
67. Karen Burke, Reforming Economic Substance, 31 VA. TAX REV. 271, 273 (2011).
68. See Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd. v Comm'r of Inland Revenue [2009] 2 NZLR
289 (SC) paras [11, 83] (N.Z.) (describing the extensive history of the New Zealand
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a GAAR.69 Numerous other countries have also used a statutory GAAR
as an anti-abuse tool for years, and the number of common law jurisdic-
tions without a GAAR is rapidly decreasing. 70
Until recently, the United States did not have any statute that was com-
parable to a GAAR. But after decades of debate on whether the United
States should enact a GAAR, on March 30, 2010, Congress enacted a
similar provision in Section 7701(o) of the Internal Revenue Code. 71
Section 7701(o) is the codified version of the economic substance doc-
trine-a long-standing judicial doctrine. In essence, it is a broadly
worded statute that prohibits taxpayers from benefitting from transac-
tions that lack either a meaningful economic effect or a substantial non-
tax purpose. 72 While Section 7701(o) is not technically a GAAR, it has
prominent GAAR-like characteristics and will likely operate much like
the GAARs in other common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, Austra-
lia, and New Zealand.73
A. THE PROVISIONS OF A MODERN GAAR
The currently operative GAARs in Canada, Australia, and New Zea-
land are representative of the modern GAARs in many common law ju-
risdictions. These GAARs, like other modem GAARs, have three
common design elements. First, each GAAR defines a tax avoidance ar-
rangement. 74 This definition identifies the prerequisites for applying the
GAAR to a transaction and generally depends on the application of
broad factors. Second, each GAAR defines a tax benefit. 75 Finally, each
GAAR contains powers of reconstruction. These powers permit the ap-
plicable revenue authority to reverse the tax outcome of the tax avoid-
ance arrangement, substitute one of the possible tax outcomes that might
have otherwise occurred or both.76
GAAR); SARS, supra note 10, at 27, 32 (describing the history of the Australian GAAR);
see also Irving Aw, Revisiting the General Anti-Avoidance Rule in Singapore, 2009 SING. J.
LEGAL STUD. 545, 547 (2009) (describing how Singapore's GAAR is based substantially on
the anti-tax avoidance provisions of Australia and New Zealand).
69. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, Part XVI (Can.).
70. Many developed countries have a statutory GAAR including Australia, Canada,
China, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Ireland, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Spain,
South Africa, and Sweden. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 28, at 119-29; Cooper,
supra note 17, at 84; McMahon, supra note 17, at 1723. In recent years, the United King-
dom and India have been prominent examples of countries without a GAAR. However,
India has a proposed GAAR, which became effective in April 2012. And the United King-
dom has recently considered the merits of enacting a GAAR. Cooper, supra note 17, at 84.
71. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067. For examples of the differing views on whether or not the
United States should enact some form of a GAAR, see supra note 17 and accompanying
text.
72. I.R.C. § 7701(o) (Supp. 2010).
73. See Evans, supra note 11, at 24; Prebble, supra note 19, at 2-3.
74. Cooper, supra note 17, at 98-99.
75. Id. at 102.
76. Id. at 103-04.
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1. Canadian GAAR Provisions
The Canadian GAAR 77 includes the common design elements of a
GAAR. It broadly defines an "avoidance transaction" as a transaction
that directly or indirectly results in a tax benefit, either by itself or as part
of a series of transactions, unless the transaction was undertaken prima-
rily for bona fide non-tax purposes. 78 In addition, it provides that an
avoidance transaction constitutes tax abuse, to which the Canadian
GAAR applies, if the avoidance transaction can "reasonably be consid-
ered" to directly or indirectly result in (a) a misuse of the provisions of
the Canadian Income Tax Act, Income Tax Regulations, Income Tax Ap-
plication Rules, other tax statutes, or a tax treaty or (b) abuse having
regard to those provisions read as a whole. 79 Transactions that are tax
driven, but within the object, spirit, and purpose of the relevant provi-
sions, do not abuse or misuse the statute. 80
The Canadian GAAR also defines a "tax benefit" to include most al-
terations to a taxpayer's tax liability. Finally, the Canadian GAAR pro-
vides the Commissioner with broad powers to reconstruct the tax
consequences in the event the Canadian GAAR applies.81
2. Australian GAAR Provisions
The Australian GAAR has been subject to several amendments. Prior
to 1981, the operative Australian GAAR (referred to herein as "Section
260") was a short and broadly worded provision that was substantially
similar to the current New Zealand GAAR.82 Despite Section 260's
broad language, a series of judicial decisions narrowly construed Section
260 and rendered it inadequate in combating even the most blatant tax
77. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1, Part XVI (Can.). The Canadian GAAR be-
came effective in 1988 and was amended retroactively in 2005 to explicitly include Ca-
nada's tax treaties within the scope of the rule.
78. Id. § 245(3).
79. Id. § 245(4).
80. The Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted the "misuse or abuse" requirement
to involve a two-step process. The first step is to interpret the provisions giving rise to the
tax benefit to determine their object, spirit, and purpose. This requires the court to engage
in a textual, contextual, and purposive analysis to determine Parliament's intention in en-
acting the relevant provisions. The second task is to determine whether the transaction
falls within or frustrates that purpose. R. v. Can. Trustco Mortg. Co., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601,
paras. 17, 55 (Can.).
This "misuse or abuse" requirement is similar to the purposive interpretation of tax stat-
utes that is required in many countries. Accordingly, the Canadian GAAR, like the New
Zealand and Australian GAARs, requires three conditions to be satisfied for the GAAR
to apply to an arrangement. First, a tax benefit must arise from the transaction. Second,
the transaction's primary purpose must be to obtain a tax benefit. Finally, the manner in
which the tax benefit is obtained must be contrary to the legislature's intent in enacting the
provision that gave rise to the claimed tax benefit. Id. para. 17.
81. Income Tax Act § 245, (1), (2), (5).
82. Section 260 provided that any arrangement that has the purpose or effect of di-
rectly or indirectly obtaining a tax benefit is void against the Commissioner. This provision




To overcome the GAAR's ineffectiveness, the Australian Parliament
repealed the GAAR in 1981 and enacted a more detailed and complex
GAAR in Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (referred to
herein as "Part IVA" or the "Australian GAAR"). 84 Part IVA, like other
modern GAARs, contains the common design elements of a GAAR.
Specifically, the Australian GAAR defines a tax avoidance arrangement
or a "scheme to which [Part IVA] applies" as existing when three require-
ments are met.85 First, there must be a "scheme. '8 6 Second, the taxpayer
must derive a tax benefit from the scheme that would not otherwise have
been available to the taxpayer if the parties had not entered into the
scheme.87 Finally, the scheme must have been entered into for the sole or
dominant purpose of obtaining a tax benefit.88 But unlike the Canadian
or New Zealand GAARs, the statute directs the courts to consider eight
statutory factors in determining the taxpayer's purpose in entering into
the scheme.89 These statutory factors focus on how the scheme is imple-
mented, its effects, and the nature of any connection between or among
the parties to the scheme. 90
In addition, the Australian GAAR broadly defines a tax benefit. 91 Fi-
83. See Lidia Xynas, Tax Planning, Avoidance and Evasion in Australia 1970-2010.
The Regulatory Responses and Taxpayer Compliance, 20 REVENUE L.J. Issue 1, Article 2
(2010).
84. See Explanatory Memorandum, Income Tax Laws Amendment Bill (No. 2) 1981
(Cth 2) (Austl.) (indicating that through the revised GAAR, the legislature sought to pro-
vide an effective general measure against tax avoidance arrangements that are "blatant,
artificial or contrived"); David Pickup, In Relation to General Anti-Avoidance Provisions:
A Comparative Study of the Legal Frameworks Used by Different Countries to Protect
Their Tax Revenues, in BEYOND BOUNDARIES: DEVELOPINO APPROACHES TO TAX AVOID-
ANCE AND TAX RISK MANAGEMENT 9,16 (Judith Freedman ed., 2008).
85. Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 177D (Austl).
86. Id. A "scheme" is any agreement, arrangement, understanding, promise, or under-
taking, whether express or implied and whether or not enforceable, or intended to be en-
forceable, by legal proceedings and any scheme, plan, proposal, action, course of action, or
course of conduct. It includes a unilateral scheme. Id. s 177A(1).
87. Id. s 177D. Tax benefits arise from a scheme only if it can be hypothesized that the
tax benefit would not have been obtained or might reasonably be expected not to have
been obtained if the scheme had not been entered into or carried out. Id. s 177C.
88. Id. s 177D.
89. Id.
90. Id. The statute identifies the following eight factors: "(i) the manner in which the
scheme was entered into or carried out; (ii) form and substance of the scheme; (iii) the
time at which the scheme was entered into and the length of the period during which the
scheme was carried out; (iv) the result in relation to the operation of [the Australian In-
come Tax] Act that, but for [Part IVA], would be achieved by the scheme; (v) any change
in financial position of the relevant taxpayer that has resulted, will result, or may reasona-
bly be expected to result, from the scheme; (vi) any change in the financial position of any
person who has, or has had, any connection (whether of a business, family or other nature)
with the relevant taxpayer, being a change that has resulted, will result or may reasonably
be expected to result, from the scheme; (vii) any other consequence for the relevant tax-
payer, or for any person referred to in subparagraph (vi), of the scheme having been en-
tered into or carried out; and (viii) the nature of any connection (whether of a business,
family or other nature) between the relevant taxpayer and any person referred to in sub-
paragraph (vi)." Id.
91. Id. s 177C(1).
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nally, the Australian GAAR, like other modern GAARs, also contains
powers of reconstruction that permit the Commissioner to deny in whole
or in part the tax benefit. 92
3. New Zealand GAAR Provisions
The New Zealand GAAR 93 is a short and broadly drafted provision
that also contains the typical design elements of a GAAR. It is com-
monly considered to be one of the oldest GAARs in existence. 94 The
current New Zealand GAAR broadly defines a tax avoidance arrange-
ment as any arrangement,
whether entered into by the person affected by the arrangement or
by another person, that directly or indirectly-(a) has tax avoidance
as its purpose or effect; or (b) has tax avoidance as 1 of its purposes
or effects, whether or not any other purpose or effect is referable to
ordinary business or family dealings, if the tax avoidance purpose or
effect is not merely incidental. 95
The New Zealand GAAR also broadly defines a tax benefit, which it
refers to as "tax avoidance. ' 96 Pursuant to the New Zealand GAAR, a
tax benefit includes, but is not limited to, "directly or indirectly altering
the incidence of any income tax."'97 Finally, the New Zealand GAAR
provides that a tax avoidance arrangement is void against the Commis-
sioner for income tax purposes and authorizes the Commissioner to
counteract any "tax advantage" obtained by a person from such an ar-
rangement in a way the Commissioner thinks appropriate. 98
92. Id. s 177F.
93. The currently operative GAAR in New Zealand refers collectively to the following
provisions of the New Zealand Income Tax Act 2007: (i) the principle anti-avoidance pro-
vision contained in Section BG 1, (ii) the relevant definitions in Section YA 1, and (iii) the
reconstruction provisions in Part G (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "New Zea-
land GAAR").
94. New Zealand has had a general anti-avoidance provision in tax legislation since
1878. In 1878, this provision was found in Section 62 of the New Zealand Land Tax Act
1878. The Commissioner's active reliance on it began during the 1960s, at which time the
general anti-avoidance provision was contained in Section 108 of the Land and Income Tax
Act 1954. Judicial criticism of its terms and their limits led to Parliament substantially
amending the general anti-avoidance provision in 1974 and replacing it with Section 99 of
the Income Tax Act 1976. The language of the general anti-avoidance provision contained
in Section 99 of the Income Tax Act 1976 substantively carried through to subsequent
general anti-avoidance provisions and eventually became the current Section BG 1 (and
related provisions) of the Income Tax Act 2007. See Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd. v
Comm'r of Inland Revenue [2008] NZSC 115 (SC) paras [11, 83] (N.Z.).
95. Income Tax Act, s YA 1 (N.Z.). An "arrangement" means any "agreement, con-
tract, plan, or understanding, whether enforceable or unenforceable, including all steps and
transactions by which it is carried into effect." Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. Tax abuse also includes directly or indirectly relieving, avoiding, postponing, or
reducing a person's liability to income tax or any potential or prospective liability to future
income tax. Id.
98. Id. ss BG1, GAl.
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B. THE U.S. VERSION OF A GAAR
As noted above, the United States' GAAR-like statute is found in Sec-
tion 7701(o) of the Code. Section 7701(o) provides that:
[i]n the case of any transaction to which the economic substance doc-
trine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having economic
substance only if-(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way
(apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic po-
sition, and (B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from
Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.99
The economic substance doctrine is a judicial doctrine created to invali-
date tax benefits from transactions that literally comply with the Internal
Revenue Code but lack economic reality. 100 It has served as one of the
government's primary weapons to fight tax abuse. 101
Despite the unique statutory language, Section 7701(o) is considerably
similar to the GAARs in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and other
common law jurisdictions. Like these other GAARs, the purpose of Sec-
tion 7701(o) is to prevent taxpayers from reaping tax benefits through
transactions that subvert the purpose of the tax code. Furthermore, Sec-
tion 7701(o) also operates similarly to these other GAARs in that it relies
heavily on the judiciary to interpret and apply the provision to specific
transactions.
Section 7701(o) also contains the elements of a modern GAAR. As
the GAARs in Canada, New Zealand, and Australia have done, Section
7701(o) defines a tax avoidance arrangement. 02 Pursuant to Section
7701(o), an abusive tax avoidance arrangement exists when two require-
ments are met. First, the common law economic substance doctrine must
be relevant to the transaction or series of transactions. 0 3 Thus, the
courts will continue to make this determination. 10 4 The statute does not
provide explicit rules for determining when Section 7701(o) applies, but
the legislative history indicates that courts should engage in a purposive
analysis of the applicable provisions to make this determination. 0 5 Sec-
99. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1) (Supp. 2010). The statute also provides that state or local in-
come tax effect, which is related to a federal income tax effect, will be treated in the same
manner as a federal income tax effect. Id. § 7701(o)(3).
Individuals engaging in personal transactions are exempt from Section 7701(o). An indi-
vidual is only subject to the statute's provisions if that individual entered into a transaction
in connection with a trade or business or an activity engaged in for the production of
income. Id. § 7701(o)(5)(B).
100. See Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
101. See Madison, supra note 18, at 443 (describing the economic substance doctrine as
a tool to combat unanticipated or difficult to prevent strategies).
102. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1), (5)(A).
103. Id. § 7701(o)(5)(C).
104. The courts will continue to determine when the economic substance doctrine ap-
plies to a transaction in the same manner as if Section 7701(o) had never been enacted. Id.
§ 7701(o)(1), (5)(C).
105. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 42, at 152-53 (stating
that tax benefits are not intended to be disallowed if the realization of tax benefits from a
transaction is consistent with Congress's purpose or plan with respect to the tax benefits).
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ond, the transaction or series of transactions constitute a tax abusive ar-
rangement if one of two conditions are met: either (1) the transaction
does not change in a meaningful way, independent of federal income tax
effects, the taxpayer's economic position or (2) the taxpayer does not
have a substantial purpose, independent of federal income tax effects, for
entering into the transaction. 10 6
The codified economic substance doctrine also limits a taxpayer's abil-
ity to rely on certain factors to prove that a transaction has economic
substance and should be respected. For instance, Section 7701(o) allows
a taxpayer to rely on a transaction's profit potential as evidence of eco-
nomic substance only if the profit potential is substantially based on a
present value analysis of the pre-tax profit and the net tax benefits.10 7
Section 7701(o) also implicitly defines a tax benefit and provides the
Commissioner with powers of reconstruction by referencing the case law
economic substance doctrine.108 A tax benefit is broadly defined as any
tax benefit under Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code. 10 9
In addition, the government is given broad powers to disallow the tax
benefits of a tax avoidance transaction.110 However, these powers are
not as broad as the reconstruction powers granted under the typical mod-
ern GAAR. Under the economic substance doctrine, the Commissioner
may reverse the tax outcome of a tax avoidance arrangement but gener-
ally may not substitute one of the possible tax outcomes that might have
otherwise occurred."' Section 7701(o) also applies a new strict liability
penalty for violations of the economic substance doctrine. 112
106. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1).
107. Specifically, "the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the
transaction [must be] substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net tax
benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were respected." Id. § 7701(o)(2). Sec-
tion 7701(o) also does not allow a taxpayer to rely on achieving a financial accounting
benefit as a purpose for entering into a transaction if the origin of such financial accounting
benefit is a reduction of federal income tax. Id. § 7701(o)(4).
108. See id. § 7701(o)(1), (5)(A).
109. Id.
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009)
(applying the economic substance doctrine to disregard for tax purposes a loan transaction
that lacked economic substance and to deny the loss deductions generated by the transac-
tion); Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (applying the
economic substance doctrine to strike down the loss deductions generated by a reorganiza-
tion transaction, which was found to lack economic substance); see also Luke, supra note
32, at 116 (stating the economic substance doctrine generally has "all-or-nothing conse-
quences for the taxpayer": either the claimed tax benefits are denied or the claimed tax
benefits are allowed).
112. Congress amended section 6662 of the Code to add a 20% understatement penalty
for disclosed transactions that lack economic substance and a 40% understatement penalty
for non-disclosed transactions that lack economic substance, and also amended section
6664(c) of the Code to eliminate the reasonable cause and good faith exception for any
transaction lacking economic substance. Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409(b), (c)(1), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067.
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IV. JUDICIAL APPROACHES THAT UNDERMINE AND
STRENGTHEN A GAAR
Despite the similarities among the GAARs, the divergence of these
measures in practice is striking. As one commentator has noted, "In an
international review of GAARs, the traditional GAARs have been hit-
or-miss affairs. 11 3 The different approaches taken by courts to interpret
and apply a GAAR have considerably influenced a GAAR's success at
identifying tax abuse and countering its detrimental effects.
This Article demonstrates that when the judiciary supports the Duke of
Westminster principle, the judicial approaches that generally emerge are
more lenient towards tax abuse. At its purest form, the Duke of West-
minster principle excessively supports tax planning at the expense of gov-
ernment.1 14 Under this principle, taxpayers may minimize their taxes as
long as the legal form of the transaction complies with the literal lan-
guage of the statutory provision.' 5 The legislature's intention in enacting
the provision and the taxpayer's motivation in entering into the transac-
tion are completely disregarded.1 1 6
An analysis and comparison of the experiences in Canada, New Zea-
land, and Australia with a GAAR reveal that these types of judicial ap-
proaches generally weaken the ability of a GAAR to strike down tax
abuse in all but the most egregious cases. Thus, these judicial approaches
significantly contribute to a GAAR becoming a "miss" rather than a
"hit" affair. On the other hand, courts that purposively interpret statutes,
consider economic substance and other objective indicia of tax abuse in
their analysis, place a reasonable burden of proof on the parties, and dis-
aggregate abusive transactions from an overall business arrangement,
tend to strengthen a GAAR's effectiveness.
A. METHOD OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Judiciaries that support the Duke of Westminster principle focus on a
particular tax provision's literal terms rather than on the provision's in-
tent in determining whether a transaction obtains inappropriate tax bene-
fits. As the experience abroad has shown, this textualist approach
113. Ed Liptak, Battling with Boundaries: The South African GAAR Experience, in BE-
YOND BOUNDARIES: DEVELOPING APPROACHES TO TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX RISK
MANAGEMENT 26 (Judith Freedman ed., 2008). Other commentators have also noted that
the international experience with GAARs shows that a GAAR's effectiveness at targeting
tax abuse is mixed. See Cooper, supra note 17, at 127; Jefferson VanderWolk, Codification
of the Economic Substance Doctrine: If We Can't Stop It, Let's Improve It, 55 TAX NOTES
INT'L 547, 547 (2009).
114. The Duke of Westminster principle emerged from the House of Lords' decision in
Inland Revenue Comm'r v. Duke of Westminster in 1936. See Inland Revenue Comm'r v.
Duke of Westminster, [1936] A.C. 1 (H.L.) (U.K). In that case, the House of Lords em-
ployed a formalistic analysis to uphold a purely tax-motivated transaction on the basis that
every taxpayer is entitled to take actions to minimize his or her taxes. See id.
115. See id. at 19 ("Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so as that the tax




significantly hinders a GAAR's ability to successfully counter tax abuse
and often permits tax abuse to flourish. 17
For instance, the Canadian and Australian GAARs have both faced
potential emasculation by their courts' textualist approach to the
GAARs. In Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court historically focused
on the literal terms of the statute, rather than the statute's intent, in its
tax avoidance jurisprudence.' 1 8 Even though the Canadian GAAR now
requires courts to purposively interpret statutes to determine if an ar-
rangement amounts to a misuse or abuse of the statute's legislative pur-
pose, in the majority of cases, the Canadian courts continue to read
statutes as textualists and adhere to a transaction's legal form.11 9 Accord-
ing to the Canadian Supreme Court, the Court will look for the purpose
of a statute, but will not assume that the legislature intended a transaction
to have any substance unless the provisions in question expressly contem-
plate or refer to economic substance. 120
This textualist approach significantly limits the potential application of
the Canadian GAAR to tax abusive transactions. For instance, in The
Queen v. MIL (Investments) S.A., the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada
refused to depart from the plain words of the treaty even though the Ca-
nadian Parliament specifically amended the Canadian GAAR in 2005 to
clarify that the Canadian GAAR applies to treaty provisions. 12 1 As a
result, the court allowed the taxpayer to benefit from a capital gains tax
exemption because the transaction complied with the literal terms of the
Canada-Luxembourg treaty, notwithstanding the transaction's clear tax-
saving purpose. 122
Similarly, in Australia, the previous Australian GAAR, Section 260,
was inadequate in combating even the most blatant tax avoidance prima-
117. See Karen C. Burke, Black & Decker in the Fourth Circuit: Tax Shelters and Textu-
alism, 111 TAX NOTES 315, 325 (2006); Brian Galle, Interpretative Theory and Tax Shelter
Regulation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 357, 359-60 (2006).
118. A significant example of this textualist approach is the express refusal of the Cana-
dian Supreme Court in Stubart Investments Ltd. v. The Queen to adopt a judicially devel-
oped business purpose test as a tool for limiting tax abusive activities because the test was
not literally expressed by a statutory provision. See Stubart Inv. Ltd. v. R., [1984] 1 S.C.R.
536 (Can.). By refusing to recognize any business purpose requirement, the Canadian Su-
preme Court upheld a tax benefit created through a series of transactions on paper. Id.
119. See Galle, supra note 117, at 383. For a discussion of the purposive method of
statutory interpretation required by the Canadian GAAR, see infra Part III.A.1. The Ca-
nadian Parliament enacted the Canadian GAAR in 1988 primarily to limit the detrimental
effects of this textualist judicial approach on tax abuse. See R. v. Can. Trustco Mortg. Co.,
[2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, para. 14 (Can.).
120. Can. Trustco, [2005] 2 S.C.R. paras. 56, 76. Even though Parliament intended the
provisions of the Canadian Income Tax Act to apply to transactions with real economic
substance, the Canadian Supreme Court has interpreted Parliament's comment regarding
economic substance to mean that the economic substance of an arrangement has little
meaning in isolation from the proper interpretation of the specific provisions of the Act.
Id.
121. [2007] 4 C.T.C. 235, para. 5 (Can. F.C.A.).
122. Id. para. 3. The evidence indicated the taxpayer entered into a series of transac-
tion primarily to qualify under the literal terms of the treaty and obtain the tax exemption.
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rily because of the formalistic approach taken by the Australian courts.123
The Australian judiciary, which relied heavily on the Duke of Westminster
principle, held that courts could disregard the legislature's "spirit and in-
tention" when determining the Australian GAAR's application to tax
avoidance. 124 This led to an explosion of aggressive tax avoidance activ-
ity in Australia in the 1970s and early 1980s. 125
Despite the foregoing, the current Australian GAAR has regained its
strength as a pivotal tool in combating tax avoidance in Australia. A fac-
tor that has significantly contributed to this shift is the current Australian
judiciary's adoption of a purposive method of statutory interpretation
when applying and interpreting the Australian GAAR. The Australian
High Court now looks beyond the mere text of the statute and seeks out
the legislature's intent in enacting a particular provision when distinguish-
ing between tax abuse and acceptable tax planning. 126 Accordingly, in
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v. Hart, the Australian High Court
unanimously applied the Australian GAAR to a particular financing ar-
rangement described as the "Wealth Optimiser," notwithstanding that the
arrangement technically complied with the statutory requirements for de-
ducting interest expenses. 127 This judicial approach has greatly contrib-
uted to the Australian GAAR's success in challenging the taxpayer's
defiance of tax liability that previously prevailed in Australia.
123. See Xynas, supra note 83, at 8. Section 260 initially worked well until Sir Garfield
Barwick became the Chief Justice of the Australian High Court and contributed to a shift
in the judicial approach to tax avoidance from the previous Australian judiciaries. Pickup,
supra note 84, at 10.
124. See Xynas, supra note 83, at 9. Pursuant to this literalist approach to statutory
interpretation, the Australian courts developed the "choice principle." See Keighery Pty.
Ltd. v Comm'r of Taxation (1957) 100 CLR 66, 92 (Austl.). Under the "choice principle,"
taxpayers could choose between alternatives provided under a literal reading of the Aus-
tralian Income Tax Act, regardless of Parliament's intention or the taxpayer's motivation.
See id.; see also Aw, supra note 68, at 549-50; G.T. Pagone, Part IVA: The General Anti-
Avoidance Provisions in Australian Taxation Law, 27 MELB. U. L. REv. 770, 774 (2003);
Xynas, supra note 83, at 9-10.
125. Xynas, supra note 83, at 10-12. For a description of the tax abuse that resulted in
Australia prior to Parliament amending the Australian GAAR, see id. at 6-10.
126. See Chris Evans, The Battle Continues: Recent Australian Experience with Statutory
Avoidance and Disclosure Rules, in BEYOND BOUNDARIES: DEVELOPING APPROACHES TO
TAX AVOIDANCE AND TAX RISK MANAGEMENT 37, 41 (Judith Freedman ed., 2008);
Xynas, supra note 83, at 37; see, e.g., Comm'r of Taxation v Consol. Press Holdings Ltd.
(2001) 207 CLR 235 (Austl.) (considering the policy and purpose of the relevant provisions
in concluding a specific provision giving rise to a tax liability applies to the transaction at
issue).
127. (2004) 217 CLR 216 (Austl.). In Hart, the taxpayers acquired a loan from a mort-
gage broker to (i) purchase a primary residence, which is ineligible for interest deductions,
and (ii) re-finance an investment property, which qualifies for interest deductions. Id. at
229. The evidence indicated that, pursuant to the "Wealth Optimiser" strategy, the parties
then split the loan into two accounts and used non-standard financing features for the sole
purpose of creating additional deductible interest payments on the investment property
account and minimizing the non-deductible interest payments on the residence account.
Id. at 229-30. The taxpayers then claimed these additional interest payments as tax deduc-
tions, because technically the payments were attributable to the investment property and,
therefore, qualified as deductible interest payments. Id. at 230.
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The New Zealand Supreme Court has also adopted a purposive ap-
proach, which has prevented many abusive transactions from escaping
the reach of the New Zealand GAAR. 128 According to the New Zealand
Supreme Court, the New Zealand GAAR requires a taxpayer to satisfy
two conditions to preclude the GAAR's application. 129 First, the tax-
payer must demonstrate that the transaction complies with the applicable
specific provisions of the New Zealand Income Tax Act in a manner that
is within its intended scope.130 This determination is based primarily on
the ordinary meaning of the specific provision, as established through its
text in light of its specific purpose. 3 1 If that is shown, the taxpayer must
also establish that the taxpayer used the specific provisions in a manner
that was "within Parliament's purpose and contemplation when it enacted
them."'1 32 If the taxpayer fails to do so, the arrangement will be a tax
avoidance arrangement and void against the Commissioner under the
New Zealand GAAR. Pursuant to this approach, it is not enough for a
transaction to literally comply with a specific tax provision for the tax-
payer to obtain the resulting tax benefit.
As the international experience has shown, courts that employ a for-
malistic method of statutory interpretation enable taxpayers to exploit
the law to generate tax benefits merely by complying with that law's tex-
tual requirements. However, merely complying with a statute's literal re-
quirements does not always generate the results that were intended by
the legislature. Therefore, it is critical for courts to determine and con-
sider legislative intent when applying a GAAR to a transaction to cor-
rectly distinguish between tax abuse and legitimate tax planning.133 Even
though the tax avoidance jurisprudence indicates that a GAAR can still
128. See, e.g., Penny v Comm'r of Inland Revenue [2012] 1 NZLR 433 (SC) para [54]
(N.Z.) (holding that even though the taxpayers' transfer of their respective businesses to
companies owned by their family trusts was entirely lawful, the use of the business struc-
ture to pay an artificially low salary to the taxpayers and avoid payment of the highest
personal tax rate was beyond parliamentary contemplation); Glenharrow Holdings Ltd. v
Comm'r ofInland Revenue [2009] 2 NZLR 359 (SC) para [34] (N.Z.) (looking "beyond the
technical legality of the constituent parts of an arrangement" to conclude an arrangement
is tax abusive).
129. Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd. v Comm'r of Inland Revenue [2009] 2 NZLR 289
(SC) para [107] (N.Z.).
130. Id. If the first test is not met, the New Zealand GAAR is not applicable. Instead,
the court will deny the taxpayer the claimed tax benefits under the specific provision of the
New Zealand Income Tax Act. Id.
131. Id. On the contrary, the minority in Ben Nevis endorsed an expansive purposive
analysis of the specific provisions to minimize the use of the GAAR in all but the most
offensive arrangements. Id. at para [9] (Elias C.J., Anderson, J., dissenting); Aw, supra
note 68, at 561.
132. Ben Nevis, [2009] 2 NZLR para [156] (majority opinion). This "parliamentary
contemplation" test is not a new approach to analyzing tax avoidance cases in New Zea-
land. It was previously referred to as the "scheme and purpose" approach. Id. para [1001.
The New Zealand Supreme Court has slightly modified this approach by revising its name
and explicitly acknowledging that the determination is made by construing specific tax pro-
visions and the New Zealand GAAR in tandem so that each is given appropriate effect.
Id. para [103]; see Craig Elliffe & Jess Cameron, The Test for Tax Avoidance in New Zea-
land. A Judicial Sea of Change, 16 N.Z. Bus. L.Q. 440, 446 (2010).
133. See Lederman, supra note 26, at 395-96.
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apply in litigated cases where the court employs a textualist approach, it
is not likely to apply to tax abusive transactions when the legislative in-
tent with respect to a specific provision is not as clear.134 By disregarding
policy and other considerations, a textualist approach undermines a
GAAR's ability to effectively identify and target tax abusive transactions,
thereby limiting the potential effectiveness of a GAAR.
B. CONSIDERATION OF ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE
Courts that consider a transaction's economic substance, or lack
thereof, when determining whether the transaction is abusive generally
increase a GAAR's effectiveness at identifying and countering tax abuse,
while the failure to do so generally undermines a GAAR's effectiveness.
As one commentator has observed, "Any GAAR or general anti-avoid-
ance doctrine must consider the economic substance of transactions if it is
to be effective.' 35
The Canadian experience with a GAAR reveals the detrimental effects
of failing to require transactions to have economic substance for the
transaction to be respected for tax purposes. In Canada, the judiciary
generally refuses to consider the arrangement's economic substance in
determining whether a transaction is abusive. Specifically, the Canadian
Supreme Court has held that a lack of economic substance does not
render a transaction abusive for purposes of the Canadian GAAR unless
the provisions in question contemplate or refer to economic substance. 136
Even if they do, the Canadian Supreme Court treats the lack of economic
substance as merely one factor and insufficient, in itself, to establish abu-
sive tax avoidance. 137 Because few statutory provisions explicitly refer to
economic substance, this judicial approach makes economic substance
unlikely to be an important factor in the application of the Canadian
GAAR.138 As a result, the Canadian GAAR fails to counteract many tax
abusive transactions that are implicitly contrary to the legislature's intent.
Thus, in countries such as Canada, where the judiciary refuses to con-
sider economic substance, the GAAR has been much less effective at dis-
tinguishing between tax abuse and tax planning. For instance, in The
Queen v. Canada Trustco Mortgage Co., a sale-leaseback transaction es-
134. See Arnold, supra, note 23, at 32; Van Der Hout, supra note 23, at 46. For exam-
ples of cases where the government has prevailed despite the textualist approach adopted
by courts see, for example, Copthorne Holdings Ltd. v. R. (2011), 339 D.L.R. 4th 385 (Can.
S.C.C.) (applying the Canadian GAAR because the text and context of the relevant tax
provision contained a specific parliamentary intent that the transaction misused); Mathew
v. R., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 643 (Can.) (applying the Canadian GAAR even though the transac-
tion complied with the literal terms of the statute because there was clear abuse or misuse
of the relevant provision).
135. Arnold, supra note 23, at 31. Other commentators also agree that economic sub-
stance is an important factor in evaluating whether transactions are abusive tax avoidance
transactions. See, e.g., Pichhadze & Pichhadze, supra note 17, at 61.
136. R. v. Can. Trustco Mortg. Co., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, paras. 56-60 (Can.).
137. Id.
138. See Arnold, supra note 23, at 31.
[Vol. 65
Tax Abuse
caped the reach of the Canadian GAAR despite the transaction's exten-
sive tax shelter characteristics. 13 9 The transaction was unreasonably
complex and involved the circular flow of money as well as other pre-
ordained and economically unnecessary steps to obtain the desired tax
benefits. The evidence indicated that the transaction clearly lacked any
economic substance, independent of the tax benefits. Specifically, the ev-
idence showed that the taxpayer essentially manufactured a cost for pur-
poses of the capital cost allowance without incurring any economic
expense or any economic risk.140 After the transaction, the taxpayer
neither economically owned the purchased property nor economically
paid for the property. 14' Despite the foregoing, the Canadian Supreme
Court did not consider this lack of economic substance as relevant to its
tax abuse analysis. Instead, it disregarded this evidence because the capi-
tal cost allowance provisions giving rise to the substantial deductions at
issue did not expressly refer to "economic risk."'1 42 As a result, the Cana-
dian GAAR failed to identify and counteract this tax abusive
arrangement. 143
On the other hand, the Australian and New Zealand experiences with a
GAAR show that taking into account a transaction's economic substance
is an effective strategy for identifying tax abuse. In Australia, the courts
have used the Australian GAAR to strike down transactions that lack
economic substance and were abusive. For instance, in Commissioner of
Taxation v. Hart, the Australian High Court used the Australian GAAR
to disregard the additional interest deductions generated by the "Wealth
Optimiser" financing arrangement, 144 partly because the transaction
lacked economic substance.' 45 The evidence showed that neither the tax-
payer nor the lender's financial position changed and no other conse-
quences resulted or were reasonably expected to result from the scheme
other than the additional interest deductions arising from the non-stan-
dard financing features of the loan. 146 As required by Part IVA's statu-
tory language, the Australian High Court considered this lack of any
economic effects other than tax benefits as relevant to its tax abuse analy-
139. [2005] 2 S.C.R. paras. 68, 73 (Can.).
140. Id. paras. 2-3.
141. Id. para. 70. The taxpayer also conceded that it entered into the transaction prima-
rily to generate the cost allowance deductions. Id. para. 1.
142. Id. para. 75.
143. On the other hand, in the United States, courts have characterized numerous sale-
leaseback transactions that exhibit similar tax shelter characteristics as tax abuse and disal-
lowed the corresponding benefits. See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89
(4th Cir. 1985) (characterizing as tax abuse a purported sale-leaseback transaction in which
no reasonable possibility of profit existed, the purchased equipment was unnecessary and
unrelated to the taxpayer's business, the transaction lacked tax-independent considera-
tions, and the taxpayer had no economic risk of loss with respect to the property). Cf.
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (respecting a sale-leaseback transac-
tion for tax purposes, because the taxpayer incurred some economic risk with respect to
the transaction and the transaction involved independent parties).
144. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
145. Comm'r of Taxation v Hart (2004) 217 CLR 216, 262 (Austl.).
146. Id. at 244-45.
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sis. Consequently, the Australian High Court used this evidence to sup-
port its conclusion that the taxpayer's dominant purpose in entering into
the transaction was to obtain a tax benefit, which constituted tax abuse
under the Australian GAAR. 147
Similarly, New Zealand courts also look to the arrangement's eco-
nomic substance and do not limit their analysis to purely legal considera-
tions when determining whether a transaction's use of a specific provision
is contrary to Parliament's intent. 148 For instance, in Glenharrow Hold-
ings Ltd. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue, after taking the arrange-
ment's lack of economic substance into account, the New Zealand
Supreme Court applied the New Zealand GAAR to deny a tax refund
arising from a mining license purchase. 149 The New Zealand Supreme
Court characterized the transaction as a tax avoidance arrangement and
denied the corresponding tax benefits under the New Zealand GAAR,
partly because the tax benefit was completely disproportionate to the ec-
onomic burden undertaken by the taxpayer.150 Thus, by placing increas-
ing importance on the economic effect and commercial realities of a
transaction in distinguishing between tax abuse and acceptable tax plan-
ning, the New Zealand Supreme Court increases the likelihood that
courts will "call a spade a spade."'15
C. CONSIDERATION OF OBJECTIVE FACTORS
In addition, the experience abroad has shown that courts that refuse to
consider certain objective indicia of tax avoidance or, instead, emphasize
subjective factors in their tax abuse analysis often hinder a GAAR's abil-
ity to distinguish tax abusive transactions from acceptable tax planning.
An inquiry into a taxpayer's subjective intent is often not helpful at iden-
147. Id. at 262-63.
148. Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd. v Comm'r of Inland Revenue [2009] 2 NZLR 289
(SC) para [109] (N.Z.) (stating that the ultimate question in determining whether the New
Zealand GAAR applies to a transaction is "whether the impugned arrangement, viewed in
a commercially and economically realistic way, makes use of the specific provision in a
manner that is consistent with Parliament's purpose").
149. [2009] 2 NZLR 359 (SC) para [54] (N.Z.).
150. Even though this case dealt with the general anti-avoidance rule in the Goods and
Services Act, rather than the New Zealand Income Tax Act, the New Zealand Supreme
Court's approach in Glenharrow applies equally in tax avoidance cases under the Income
Tax Act 1994. Comm'r of Inland Revenue v Penny [2010] 3 NZLR 360 (CA) para [67]
(N.Z.), affid, [2012] 1 NZLR 433 (SC).
In Glenharrow, the Court concluded that an objective view of the circumstances re-
vealed the taxpayer did not incur any economic expense for the mining license and the
vendor did not obtain any economic benefit. Specifically, it was commercially impossible
that the taxpayer would pay the vendor because the assets to be used for repayment were
shrinking in value and had a limited practical life, there was a gross disparity between the
price and the size of the purchaser, and the purchaser was virtually un-capitalized, and the
obligation, although a legal obligation, was not supported by its shareholder. Glenharrow,
[2009] 2 NZLR 359 paras [51-54].
151. See Ben Nevis [2009] 2 NZLR 289 para [109]; Elliffe & Cameron, supra note 132,
at 455. While New Zealand courts have always had this ability to consider economic sub-
stance in the context of tax avoidance cases, the courts' propensity to use it has varied.
Elliffe & Cameron, supra note 132, at 455.
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tifying tax abusive transactions because a purely tax-motivated transac-
tion is not always abusive. In some instances, the legislature may have
intended for the tax benefits to encourage taxpayers to make a particular
investment or to engage in a particular activity. 152 Both courts and tax-
payers can also easily manipulate this factor, which further decreases its
usefulness.1 53 For instance, most sophisticated, or at least prudent, tax-
payers consider taxes in arranging their affairs regardless of whether the
transaction is legitimate or abusive. 154 Thus, if the court believes the ar-
rangement "smells" bad and wants to disregard the transaction, it may
easily find some evidence of the taxpayer's intent to avoid taxes. t55 On
the other hand, taxpayers can also manipulate this factor by manufactur-
ing evidence of their own intent, such as developing a business purpose
for a tax strategy after the transaction has been completed. 1
56
Accordingly, courts reduce potential manipulation and thereby in-
crease a GAAR's effectiveness and its fair application by focusing on the
objective purpose of the transaction and disregarding the taxpayer's sub-
jective tax motivation in determining whether or not to uphold the
claimed tax result. For instance, the statutory requirement to consider
certain objective factors as relevant in the tax abuse analysis has strength-
ened the Australian GAAR's effectiveness. 157 As stated by the Austra-
152. For instance, in the United States, the low-income housing credit in section 42 of
the Code, the production tax credit in section 45 of the Code, and the energy credit in
section 48 of the Code are a few examples of tax credits that were created to incentivize
taxpayers to engage in a particular behavior. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXA-
TION, supra note 42, at 152.
153. See Lederman, supra note 26, at 392.
154. Id. at 417-18 (arguing that a false dichotomy exists because all profit-motivated
transactions in a world with taxes are motivated by after-tax profit).
155. Madison, supra note 18, at n.33 (citing ACM P'ship v. Comm'r, 157 F.3d 231, 265
(3d Cir. 1998) (McKee J., dissenting) ("If the scheme in question smells bad, the intent to
avoid taxes defines the result as we do not want the taxpayer to 'put one over.'")).
156. Lederman, supra note 26, at 398.
157. See Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) s 177D(b) (Austl.) (identifying eight
statutory factors to be taken into account in determining whether a dominant tax avoid-
ance purpose exists); Comm'r of Taxation v Hart (2004) 217 CLR 216, 240-41 (Austl.)
(requiring courts to consider whether it would be concluded "having regard to the eight
matters listed in [the statute], that a person who entered into or carried out the ... scheme,
did so for the dominant purpose of enabling the [taxpayer] to obtain a tax benefit in con-
nection with the scheme").
However, the analysis in Australia is not entirely dependent on only objective factors.
According to the Australian High Court, the determination of an arrangement's purpose
also depends on whether having regard to the factors described in the statute, a reasonable
person would conclude that the taxpayer entered into or carried out the scheme for the
dominant purpose of enabling the taxpayer to obtain a tax benefit. Comm'r of Taxation v
Spotless Servs. Ltd. (1996) 186 CLR 404, 422 (Austl.). Thus, courts must consider what
other possibilities existed when determining whether the eight statutory factors indicate
that the dominant purpose was to obtain tax benefits. Hart, 217 CLR at 244-45. The
reasonable person standard has given rise to difficult litigation and potentially difficult
questions of interpretation. The application of this reasonable person standard often de-
pends on how a particular court views the facts and the objective purpose of the scheme,
which is often in the "eye of the beholder." For a further description of this issue refer to
G.T. Pagone's discussion in Hon. J. G.T. Pagone, Part IVA: Where Are We and Where
Are We Going? The Big Picture, Address Before the Tax Institute of Australia (Mar. 1,
2011). Australian courts apply a similar reasonable person standard in determining
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lian High Court, one reason the Australian Parliament made the
Australian GAAR's application dependent on the objective factors listed
in the statute was to avoid having the operation of Part IVA depend on
the "fiscal awareness of [the] taxpayer."1 58 Therefore, in Australia, a tax-
payer cannot succeed in defending an assessment under the Australian
GAAR by relying upon the lack of a subjective intent to obtain a tax
benefit.1 59
Similarly, the New Zealand GAAR has also proven to be effective,
partly because the New Zealand GAAR's application is not contingent
on the taxpayer's subjective tax motive or purpose. Instead, the New Zea-
land GAAR applies when the court is satisfied that the arrangement's
objective purpose is to defeat the intent and purpose of the tax act or any
of its provisions. 160 Therefore, even if the evidence does not indicate that
the taxpayer had a tax avoidance purpose, if the court deduces a tax
avoidance purpose from the arrangement itself, or from the arrange-
ment's effect, the taxpayer may be denied the transaction's tax
benefits.1 61
The New Zealand Supreme Court, rather than Parliament, has identi-
fied certain factors as relevant, but not determinative, in identifying tax
abuse under the New Zealand GAAR.162 Furthermore, the New Zea-
land tax avoidance jurisprudence illustrates how taking into account these
indicia of tax avoidance increases the likelihood that a GAAR will cap-
ture tax avoidance arrangements that are contrary to parliamentary con-
templation. For instance, in Ben Nevis, after considering the objective
evidence, the New Zealand Supreme Court concluded the transaction
was outside of parliamentary intent and therefore an abusive tax avoid-
ance transaction under the New Zealand GAAR.163 The transaction in-
volved an investment in a forest development syndicate, known as the
"Trinity Scheme," which was designed to generate tax deductions through
whether it is reasonable to expect that the tax benefit claimed by the taxpayer was derived
from the scheme. Comm'r of Taxation v Peabody (1994) 181 CLR 359, 363 (Austl.).
158. Comm'r of Taxation v Consol. Press Holdings Ltd. (2001) 207 CLR 235, 264
(Austl.).
159. Hart, 217 CLR at 243.
160. Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd. v Comm'r of Inland Revenue [2009] 2 NZLR 289
(SC) paras [35, 37] (N.Z.).
However, despite this approach taken by the New Zealand Supreme Court, the courts
continue to introduce some subjective elements to the GAAR analysis, which potentially
results in over-application of the New Zealand GAAR. For instance, the New Zealand
Supreme Court has also indicated that the artificial or contrived nature of a transaction is
highly relevant to determining whether a transaction is abusive. Id. para [108]. This factor
is often a subjective determination. Thus, there is risk that tax avoidance determinations
utilizing this factor will be based on an instinctive view of the merits of the tax outcomes.
Trombitas, supra note 27, at 366.
161. See Ben Nevis, [20091 2 NZLR 289 para [39].
162. These possible factors include "the manner in which the arrangement is carried out
... the role of all the relevant parties and any relationship they may have with the tax-
payer[,] .. the economic and commercial effects of documents and transactions[,] ... the
duration of the arrangement and the nature and extent of the financial consequences that it




promissory notes. 1 64 As a result of the arrangement, the taxpayers ob-
tained a tax benefit because the promissory notes caused the taxpayers to
incur expenses for tax purposes. But, in reality, the notes were not sub-
ject to cash payments for approximately fifty years. The New Zealand
Supreme Court concluded that the excessive length of time between the
incurrence of the expense and the date of repayment, together with the
absence of securities over other assets or personal guarantees from the
taxpayers' shareholders, indicated that the taxpayers would probably
never repay the notes with their own resources. Moreover, the prospects
of profit were remote at the time the arrangement was entered into, the
notes were commercially unnecessary, and the notes did not give rise to
economic consequences on either side.1 65 Because the objective evidence
indicated that the transaction was abusive, the New Zealand Supreme
Court applied the New Zealand GAAR to override the taxpayers'
claimed tax benefits from the transaction. 166
On the contrary, the Canadian Supreme Court undermines the poten-
tial effectiveness of the Canadian GAAR by limiting the objective factors
that may be considered in determining whether a tax avoidance transac-
tion is abusive. The Canadian Supreme Court does so by focusing prima-
rily on whether the taxpayer complied with the literal terms of the
statute. Specifically, in accordance with the Duke of Westminster princi-
ple, the Canadian Supreme Court generally supports the proposition that
a taxpayer is subject to tax based on what the taxpayer legally did. How-
ever, by disregarding the economic substance of what was done, the Ca-
nadian courts exclude a relevant indicia of tax avoidance from their tax
abuse analysis to the detriment of the Canadian GAAR's usefulness.167
Thus, the Canadian courts omit an objective factor that could be signifi-
cantly relevant for determining whether the use of specific statutory pro-
visions is outside of the legislature's intent and, consequently, abusive.
D. BURDEN OF PROOF
The burden of proof in establishing the existence or lack of tax abuse
under a GAAR also contributes to the strength of a GAAR as an anti-
abuse tool. To the extent this burden of proof is reasonable, it should not
impact a GAAR's effectiveness. But when a judiciary imposes an unrea-
sonably onerous burden of proof on either party, a GAAR can lose some
of its effectiveness in countering abusive transactions.
For instance, many countries place the burden of proving that a trans-
164. Id. para [14].
165. Id. para [147]. The Court characterized the promissory note as an artificial ele-
ment of the arrangement because it was given before the expenditure was incurred, which
from a business point of view is a gratuitous mechanism and lacked economic effect. In
reality, the promissory notes constituted an artificial payment implemented for taxation
purposes. Id. paras [119, 147].
166. Id. para [148].
167. See Tom Akin et al., Economic Substance Around the World (Part 1), 16 J. IT 'L
TAX'N 50, 56 (2005); R. v. Can. Trustco Mortg. Co., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, para. 11 (Can.).
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action constitutes legitimate tax planning on the taxpayer. 168 In New
Zealand, the taxpayer has the burden of proof in tax controversies that
involve the application of the New Zealand GAAR169 and, thus, the bur-
den of proving that the arrangement is within Parliament's intention.170
This approach likely facilitates the government's ability to use a GAAR
to successfully counter more tax-abusive transactions. But this approach
potentially also leads to over-application of the GAAR because, in these
situations, taxpayers often face an uphill battle to satisfy this burden of
proof when accused by the Commissioner of tax avoidance. 171
On the other hand, judiciaries that support the Duke of Westminster
principle generally attempt to protect a taxpayer's right to plan tax strat-
egy from an unpredictable application of a GAAR. In doing so, these
judiciaries often shift the burden to prove the abusive nature of the trans-
action to the government. For instance, in Canada, the government has
the burden of proving that the Canadian GAAR applies to a transaction
before a court will apply the Canadian GAAR to invalidate a transac-
tion.172 However, the Canadian Supreme Court has not only shifted the
burden of proving the abusive nature of the transaction to the govern-
ment, but has also imposed a high evidentiary threshold for applying the
Canadian GAAR.173 Specifically, to justify the Canadian GAAR's appli-
cation, the Minister must both clearly identify the legislative intent of the
provisions that have allegedly been frustrated or defeated, as well as es-
tablish that the transaction clearly frustrates that purpose. 174 If the abu-
sive nature of the transaction is not clear, the benefit of the doubt goes to
the taxpayer.' 75 The Minister must also overcome the initial assumption
that the tax benefit conferred by the plain words of the statutory provi-
sion is not abusive. 176
The Canadian experience illustrates that when the judiciary imposes an
unreasonably onerous burden of proof on the government, they effec-
tively limit the potential application of a GAAR. As a result of this judi-
cial approach, taxpayers may successfully engage in a broader range of
tax-minimizing activities without coming in conflict with the Canadian
GAAR. In addition, judges who are sympathetic to tax avoidance activi-
ties will find it easier to rationalize not applying the Canadian GAAR.177
168. See, e.g., Comm'r of Inland Revenue v Penny [2010] 3 NZLR 360 (CA) para [69]
(N.Z.) (stating the taxpayer has the burden of proof in New Zealand), aftd, [2012] 1
NZLR 433 (SC); see also Cooper, supra note 17, at 102 (concluding that the international
experience with GAARs reveals that once the GAAR is triggered, the burden is generally
on the taxpayer to disprove its applicability).
169. Penny, [2010] 3 NZLR 360 para [69].
170. Id.
171. See Aw, supra note 68, at 557-58.




176. Id. para. 17.
177. See, e.g., Lehigh Cement Ltd. v. R., [2010] 5 C.T.C. 13 (Can. CA) (permitting a
taxpayer to engage in a debt-restructuring arrangement with non-commercial features for
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Accordingly, in Lehigh Cement Ltd. v. The Queen, the Federal Court of
Appeal, unanimously reversing the Tax Court's decision, upheld a tax-
payer's debt restructuring arrangement. 178 The taxpayer entered into
the arrangement for the sole purpose of obtaining a withholding tax ex-
emption on its current interest payments to a foreign affiliate. The Tax
Court characterized the transaction as abusive tax avoidance because the
"object, spirit and purpose" of the withholding tax exemption was to help
Canadian corporations increase their access to international markets, but,
in reality, this arrangement did not increase the corporation's access to an
international market. 179 But the Federal Court of Appeal disagreed. The
Court of Appeal concluded that the Minister failed to clearly establish
this particular purpose.' 80 Even though the disputed arrangement vio-
lated the legislative purpose of the provision, the Federal Court of Ap-
peal respected the transaction as legitimate tax planning. 18
E. METHOD OF IDENTIFYING THE RELEVANT SCHEME
In addition, a court's willingness to disaggregate transactions and test
each transaction individually when applying a GAAR is critical to in-
creasing a GAAR's effectiveness at identifying and countering tax abuse.
The literature has also recognized the importance of this factor.' 82 As the
scholar Leandra Lederman observed, "[T]he fact that a strategy is inte-
grated into the taxpayer's business, rather than existing alongside it,
should not affect the determination of whether that strategy is abusive[,]
[because] [i]f the activity is abusive, it is socially wasteful regardless of
how connected it is to the taxpayer's business.' 83 Without a court's abil-
ity to disaggregate transactions and apply a GAAR to individual steps
within a larger transaction, taxpayers can easily manipulate transactions
to satisfy a GAAR by inserting abusive transactions into an overall legiti-
mate business scheme.
Accordingly, the Australian High Court has strengthened the Austra-
lian GAAR's effectiveness by holding that the Australian GAAR can ap-
ply even if a rational commercial purpose exists for the transaction.1 84
Specifically, in Australia, the existence of an overall commercial purpose
the sole purpose of obtaining tax benefits), rev'd in part Lehigh Cement Ltd. v. R., [2009]
D.T.C. 776; Brian J. Arnold, The Long, Slow, Steady Demise of the General Anti-Avoid-
ance Rule, 52 CAN. TAX J. 488, 498 (2004).
178. [2010] 5 C.T.C. 13, para. 44. To comply with the technical requirements of the
withholding tax exemption, the parties modified and sold the future interest payments on
the loan to an unrelated foreign bank. However, the parties structured the transaction so
that the unrelated foreign bank incurred no economic risk of loss on its investment and the
foreign affiliate retained its right to receive the principal payments on the debt. Id. paras.
11-17.
179. Id. para. 19.
180. Id. para. 44.
181. Id.
182. See Lederman, supra note 26, at 393, 402; McMahon, supra note 17, at 1728.
183. Lederman, supra note 26, at 402.
184. Comm'r of Taxation v Consol. Press Holdings Ltd. (2001) 207 CLR 235, 264
(Austl.); Comm'r of Taxation v Spotless Serv. Ltd. (1996) 186 CLR 404, 407 (Austl.).
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for an arrangement is not determinative. Instead, if part of an arrange-
ment has a "ruling, prevailing or most influential" tax avoidance purpose,
the Commissioner and the courts may apply the Australian GAAR to
that portion of the arrangement and deny the taxpayer the tax benefits
from that step.185 For instance, in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v.
Consolidated Press Holdings Ltd., the High Court applied the Australian
GAAR to a scheme that had a dominant tax avoidance purpose, even
though the scheme was part of the taxpayer's financing of a takeover bid,
which clearly had a commercial purpose when taken as a whole.186 By
disaggregating the transaction, the High Court was able to deny the tax-
payer the tax benefits generated in a transaction that undermined the
legislative purpose of the provision. 18 7
Similarly, the New Zealand Supreme Court has also strengthened the
New Zealand GAAR's effectiveness by recognizing that "tax avoidance
can be found in the individual steps" in an arrangement or "in a combina-
tion of steps. '188 As a result, even though an arrangement has an overall
business purpose, the New Zealand Supreme Court has refused to find
that the insertion of a step with a tax avoidance purpose into that ar-
rangement shields that step from the New Zealand GAAR's application
when that step generates tax benefits in a manner that is beyond parlia-
mentary contemplation. 189 For instance, in Penny & Hooper, the New
Zealand Supreme Court appears to have correctly disaggregated from an
overall legitimate business arrangement a tax abusive transaction. 190 The
evidence indicated that the taxpayers used a legitimate business structure
to pay themselves artificially low salaries in order to re-characterize the
remainder of their earnings as company dividends. 191 As a result, the
185. Comm'r of Taxation v Hart (2004) 217 CLR 216, 242-43 (Austl.) (clarifying its
earlier decision in Peabody by concluding that the Commissioner may focus on the tax-
driven portion of a transaction even if the overall transaction is done for legitimate com-
mercial purposes); Consol. Press, 207 CLR at 264 (stating that it is not "artificial and inap-
propriate" to observe that a portion of an overall commercial transaction has a dominant
tax avoidance purpose); Spotless, 186 CLR at 423 (defining the term "dominant" pursuant
to its ordinary meaning).
186. 207 CLR at 264. In this case, the Court determined that one part of the transac-
tion-the interposition of an otherwise dormant entity into the transaction-was entered
into primarily to obtain a tax benefit and the Court therefore disallowed the tax benefit.
Id. at 264-65.
187. See id.
188. Ben Nevis Forestry Ventures Ltd. v Comm'r of Inland Revenue [2009] 2 NZLR 289
(SC) para [105] (N.Z.).
189. See id.; Penny v Comm'r of Inland Revenue [2012] 1 NZLR 433 (SC) para [49]
(N.Z.).
190. See Penny, [2012] 1 NZLR 433 para 49.
191. Id. para 35. In Penny, two surgeons, who conducted their practice on their own
account, each formed a family company to purchase their practice and transferred the
practice to that company. Id. para 1. Following the transfer, the company paid the rele-
vant surgeon a salary, which the parties conceded was commercially unrealistic, and sub-
stantially lower than the income each surgeon previously derived. Id. paras 14-16. By
retaining the majority of the surgeon's wages in the company and treating only an artifi-
cially low amount as the surgeon's salary, each surgeon received the benefit of a lower




taxpayers were taxed on the majority of their earnings at the much lower
dividend tax rate without suffering any corresponding economic harm.192
The Court held that even though the use of the corporate structure was
lawful, the taxpayers' payment of a commercially unreasonable salary
was an artificial method to generate tax benefits that were not intended
by Parliament. 193 Therefore, the New Zealand Supreme Court character-
ized that step in the business arrangement as a tax abusive transaction
under the New Zealand GAAR.194
V. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CODIFIED ECONOMIC
SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE
We have yet to see whether the newly enacted Section 7701(o) will be
effective at fighting tax abuse. This Article argues that the Canadian,
Australian, and New Zealand experiences with GAARs demonstrate us
that although Section 7701(o) is not a universal cure for tax abuse, it can
be used to identify and counter many of the aggressive tax abuse schemes
that undermine our tax system. The overall statutory language of Section
7701(o), together with the judicial approaches that U.S. courts have pre-
viously adopted with respect to the economic substance doctrine, are con-
sistent with many approaches taken abroad that tend to strengthen a
GAAR. However, the international experience also reveals certain chal-
lenges that will likely arise in our use of Section 7701(o) as an anti-abuse
measure. Thus, this Article proposes several statutory amendments and
other steps we can take to avoid some of the pitfalls that could limit Sec-
tion 7701(o)'s effectiveness in minimizing tax abuse in the United States.
A. TREND FROM PURPOSIVE TO TEXTUALIST INTERPRETATION
The United States has never adopted the Duke of Westminster princi-
ple, which has contributed to the United States' development and previ-
ous successes with the common law economic substance doctrine as an
anti-abuse measure.1 95 In fact, at approximately the same time the
House of Lords rendered the Duke of Westminster decision in the United
Kingdom, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Gregory v. Helvering. In Gregory, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized
that taxpayers do not have an absolute right to arrange their affairs in a
manner that minimizes taxes.196 Unlike the Duke of Westminster princi-
192. Id. para 2.
193. Id. para 49.
194. Id. paras 49, 54.
195. As examples of cases where courts have held that a transaction that complies with
the literal terms of the Code is abusive, see, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935);
Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Coltec Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
196. Gregory, 293 U.S. at 465. In this case, the Supreme Court established the sub-
stance-over-form doctrine, as well as the basis of the other judicial doctrines that focus on
the transaction's substance rather than solely its legal form. Id. at 469-70. The related
judicial anti-abuse doctrines include the business purpose doctrine, the step transaction
doctrine, the sham doctrine, and the economic substance doctrine. Yoram Keinan, The
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pie, U.S. courts must focus on a transaction's substance and a tax provi-
sion's purpose, rather than solely on the provision's literal text, when
determining whether to respect a transaction as legitimate tax
planning. 197
By rejecting the application of the Duke of Westminster principle, the
U.S. Supreme Court effectively adopted a purposive approach with re-
spect to tax statutes and influenced the creation of the economic sub-
stance doctrine. As the international experiences with a GAAR indicate,
a textualist approach to statutory interpretation undermines a GAAR's
effectiveness. Thus, the American courts' adoption of a generally purpo-
sive approach to statutory interpretation has historically helped counter
tax abuse in the United States by disregarding numerous transactions that
intentionally circumvented the legislative purpose of a provision to reap
tax benefits. 198
However, recent U.S. tax jurisprudence indicates a trend toward "plain
text" statutory interpretation, without regard to context or policy. 199 Sig-
nificantly, in 2001 the U.S. Supreme Court applied a textualist approach
to uphold a transaction that generated a "double windfall" of tax benefits
in Gitlitz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 200 Specifically, the Su-
preme Court stated: "[B]ecause the Code's plain text permits the taxpay-
ers here to receive these benefits, we need not address this policy
concern. 201 Since then, numerous courts have applied a similar textual-
ist approach to uphold transactions that literally comply with the statu-
tory requirements of a provision.20 2 They have done so by narrowly
interpreting the economic substance doctrine or refusing to apply the
doctrine altogether. Unfortunately, this trend toward textualism has un-
Economic Substance Doctrine-Past, Present, and Future, 47 TAX MGMT. MEMO. 259
(2006).
197. See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 468-69.
198. See, e.g., id. at 470 (denying the tax benefit arising from a reorganization because
Congress intended for reorganizations to have a business purpose, and the reorganization
in the instant case lacked a business purpose); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 367
(1960) (denying the claimed interest deduction generated by a purported loan because
Congress did not intend for the relevant Code provision to allow a deduction under these
circumstances).
199. See Galle, supra note 117, at 358-59; Madison, supra note 18, at 458; Pichhadze &
Pichhadze, supra note 17, at 63.
200. 531 U.S. 206, 219-20 (2001). Shareholders of an S-corporation obtained a double
tax benefit by using discharge of debt income, which was excluded from the gross income
of the insolvent S-corporation, to increase their basis in the S-corporation and then deduct
on their personal income tax returns the S-corporation's losses and deductions. Id. at
208-10. However, the double tax benefit obtained by the taxpayers in Gitlitz has been
overruled by legislation and is no longer available to taxpayers pursuant to Section 402 of
the Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-147, § 402, 116 Stat.
21, 40.
201. Gitlitz, 531 U.S. at 220.
202. See, e.g., Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 756 (2004) (stating,
"where a taxpayer has satisfied all statutory requirements established by Congress.... the
use of the 'economic substance' doctrine to trump 'mere compliance with the Code' would
violate the separation of powers"), rev'd, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Compaq Com-
puter Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); IES Indus. Inc. v. United States, 253
F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001).
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dermined the common law economic substance doctrine's ability to target
tax abuse. 20 3
Congress's codification of the economic substance doctrine in Section
7701(o) has helped minimize some of the negative effects of this textualist
trend. As described above, the literal language of Section 7701(o) im-
poses two requirements on every "relevant" transaction to which a Code
section might otherwise apply: an economic effect requirement and a
non-tax business purpose requirement.20 4 Thus, codification prevents
textualist courts from claiming that the economic substance doctrine is
not literally required by statute and therefore refusing to recognize the
existence of the doctrine. Moreover, the statutory language of Section
7701(o) also makes it difficult for textualist judges to ignore the absence
of a non-tax purpose or the absence of any economic effect in their tax
abuse analysis as these requirements are literally required by Section
7701(o).
Despite the foregoing, codifying the economic substance doctrine does
not completely prevent the textualist approach from undermining the
government's fight against tax abuse. Although Congress has statutorily
clarified when a transaction has economic substance, Congress has left
the determination of when economic substance is "relevant" and should
be applied to the courts. As one commentator correctly observes, "[T]hat
leaves textualist courts hostile to purposive interpretation free to ignore
the doctrine. '205 Therefore, Congress may need to amend Section
7701(o) if textualist courts interpret Section 7701(o) in a manner that
makes it not applicable to transactions that obtain tax benefits by satisfy-
ing the literal terms of the statute but circumvent the Code's purpose.
In the event that this situation arises, this Article proposes that Con-
gress should expressly state in the statute that Section 7701(o) is relevant
to transactions that contradict the purpose of the specific provision and
provide a manner for making this determination. Currently, Congress
has only indicated in the legislative history that the economic substance
doctrine's relevance to a transaction depends on whether the transac-
tion's tax benefits are consistent with the congressional purpose or plan
that the tax benefits were designed to effectuate. But, as the Canadian
203. Although some of the decisions where courts have applied a textualist approach to
narrowly interpret the economic substance doctrine have been overturned on appeal, these
cases reveal the significant textualist focus of statutory interpretation in the United States
and a weakening of the common law economic substance doctrine. See Burke, supra note
117, at 315 (describing how the Fourth Circuit's textualist approach in Black & Decker
Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006), leads to a skewed interpretation of
statutory provisions and may ultimately erode the economic substance doctrine); Galle,
supra note 117, at 363 (arguing that the recent textualist approach threatens the viability of
the economic substance doctrine); Madison, supra note 18, at 458 (suggesting the district
court decision in Coltec potentially lays out a basis for refusing to apply the common law
version of the economic substance doctrine); Ventry, supra note 17, at 1408 (noting that
many observers believed the government losses indicated the "death knell of the economic
substance doctrine").
204. I.R.C. § 7701(o) (Supp. 2010).
205. Galle, supra note 117, at 402.
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experience with similar language has demonstrated, this amendment on
its own may not completely save Section 7701(o) from potential
emasculation.
Thus, when making this amendment, Congress should also specify that
the congressional intent does not need to be expressly provided in the
relevant provision but may be determined in light of the applicable statu-
tory or regulatory framework. In other words, Congress should require
courts to employ a purposive method of statutory interpretation with re-
spect to tax abusive transactions. Congress should also include the man-
ner for determining congressional intent to provide both the courts and
taxpayers guidance in determining congressional intent when the statute
is silent. By doing so, Congress would make Section 7701(o)'s application
more uniform and predictable and less likely to deter legitimate transac-
tions. Many commentators have discussed methods of incorporating a
congressional intent inquiry into tax disputes that are worthy of congres-
sional consideration but this is beyond the scope of this Article.206 For
instance, Congress could provide a systemized framework for determin-
ing congressional intent.207 Alternatively, Congress could provide an an-
gel list of tax-favored transactions that are exempt from Section 7701(o)
because Congress intended for the tax benefits to be permitted despite
any tax avoidance purpose.20 8
B. EMPHASIS ON ECONOMIC EFFECTS
In addition, U.S. courts' emphasis on the economic substance of a
transaction when distinguishing between legitimate and abusive tax trans-
actions will probably also strengthen Section 7701(o) as an anti-abuse
measure. Unlike Canada, where the Canadian GAAR is silent about the
economic substance factor and Canadian courts have refused to consider
the economic effect of an arrangement, Section 7701(o) expressly re-
quires U.S. courts to consider economic substance when distinguishing
tax abuse from acceptable tax planning. 20 9 By statutorily clarifying that a
transaction must have economic effects other than federal tax benefits to
be respected, Congress has precluded textualist courts from disregarding
the relevance of economic substance as a factor in the tax abuse analysis.
206. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 117, at 380-87 (suggesting a method for Congress to
enable courts to more easily identify what portions of their statutes are designed to incen-
tivize taxpayers through subsidies and what portions are not); Lederman, supra note 26, at
392 (citing to other articles where commentators have addressed the mechanics of how to
discern congressional intent with respect to a particular tax provision).
207. Galle, supra note 117, at 391-92 (suggesting that a clear statement of rules for
intended tax benefits would be beneficial in determining congressional intent).
208. Lederman, supra note 26, at 443 (describing a framework that has been developed
by other scholars that could include a nonexhaustive list of categories into which certain
tax provisions fall, such as "(1) 'provisions that are part of the general structure of the
Code'; (2) two types of 'giveaways'; and (3) two types of deviations from general principles
to reflect administrative realities").
209. See I.R.C. § 7701(o).
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As the international experience illustrates, a court that takes economic
substance into account in its tax abuse analysis is more likely to strike
down an abusive transaction. Accordingly, unlike The Queen v. Canada
Trustco Mortgage Co., where the Canadian Supreme Court upheld a pur-
ported sale-leaseback transaction despite the lack of any meaningful eco-
nomic effect,2 10 in Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner,211 the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals characterized a similar transaction as abusive
tax avoidance. 2 12 The U.S. court reached this conclusion even though the
relevant tax provisions did not specifically state that a transaction is re-
quired to have economic substance to be respected. In fact, the court
disallowed the tax deductions relating to the sale-leaseback transaction
because no reasonable possibility of profit existed, the purchased equip-
ment was unnecessary and unrelated to the taxpayer's business, the trans-
action lacked tax-independent considerations, and the taxpayer had no
economic risk of loss with respect to the property.
213
Moreover, Congress has further strengthened Section 7701(o)'s effec-
tiveness as a tool for distinguishing between tax abuse and tax planning
by eliminating any pre-tax profit potential requirement.214 Because mere
profit potential no longer necessitates a finding that a transaction has eco-
nomic substance, Section 7701(o)'s statutory language has reduced the
possibility of taxpayer manipulation and a finding of economic substance
when the economic realities of the transaction are insignificant in relation
to the tax benefits. Instead, Section 7701(o) requires taxpayers to prove
that "the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from [f]ederal
210. [2005] 2 S.C.R. 601, paras. 73-78 (Can.).
211. 81 T.C. 184 (1983), affd in part, rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985).
212. Id. at 204. See supra Part IV.B. for a description of the Canadian Supreme Court's
treatment of a similar purported sale-leaseback transaction.
Although the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals used the common law economic sub-
stance doctrine to invalidate the transaction in Rice's Toyota World, the same result is
likely to occur under Section 7701(o). See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
supra note 42, at 152 (stating that Section 7701(o) "clarifies" the application of the eco-
nomic substance doctrine); Alison Bennett, Corporate Taxes: IRS Analysis of Economic
Substance Cases to Remain Unchanged Following Codification, DAILY TAX REP., May 10,
2011, at G-7 (reporting that the IRS Associate Chief Counsel, William Alexander, stated
that the IRS analysis of economic substance cases will not change as a result of codification
of the doctrine).
213. Rice's Toyota World, 752 F.2d at 91-95. Cf Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435
U.S. 561 (1978) (respecting a sale-leaseback transaction for tax purposes even though the
transaction limited the taxpayer's economic return because the transaction involved inde-
pendent parties, with bona fide negotiations, the taxpayer committed its own capital and
was liable on the note for the property purchase, and the taxpayer incurred some economic
risk with respect to the transaction).
214. Prior to codification, some courts required a transaction to have pre-tax profit po-
tential to be respected under the economic substance doctrine. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United
States, 364 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1960) (denying interest deductions arising from the taxpayer's
transactions with an insurance company because the transactions had no potential for eco-
nomic gain beyond a tax deduction); Goldstein v. Comm'r, 364 F.2d 734, 740 (2d Cir. 1966)
(holding that the taxpayer entered into a leveraged purchase of U.S. bonds without any
realistic expectation of pre-tax profit and solely to secure tax benefits in the form of an
interest deduction that would offset the economic loss generated by the transaction and
therefore denying the tax benefits).
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income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position. '215 A taxpayer can
rely on a transaction's profit potential to prove the transaction had an
economic effect, but, according to Section 7701(o), this factor can be
taken into account only if the profit potential is substantial in relation to
the tax benefits.216 Thus, this statutory language prevents courts from
incorrectly characterizing an abusive transaction as legitimate merely be-
cause it has nominal pre-tax profit. 2 17
C. CONSIDERATION OF SUBJECTIVE BUSINESS PURPOSE
On the other hand, Section 7701 (o)'s focus on the taxpayer's subjective
purpose for entering into a transaction potentially undermines the stat-
ute's ability to identify and counter abusive transactions. Because a tax-
payer's subjective motivation is subject to manipulation, focusing on the
taxpayer's subjective purpose for entering into a particular arrangement
enables taxpayers to satisfy the non-tax purpose requirement by
fabricating sufficient evidence of a significant non-tax purpose after the
fact.218 In addition, focusing on the taxpayer's subjective purpose also
undermines Section 7701(o), because the taxpayer's reason for engaging
in a transaction does not necessarily correspond to the congressional in-
tent with respect to the provision generating the tax benefits. Therefore,
215. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A) (Supp. 2010).
216. Id. § 7701(o)(2)(A). There are still issues left to resolve with respect to this factor.
Although the statute states that "the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax
profit from the transaction is substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net
tax benefits" from the transaction, it does not clarify what "substantial" means for these
purposes. See id. The statute also does not clarify what discount rate should be used in
making this calculation. See id.
217. Congress likely clarified that courts can only consider profit potential as evidence
of economic substance when the profit potential is substantial to reverse results in cases
such as Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comm'r, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001). See McMahon,
supra note 17, at 1727; Prebble, supra note 19, at 3. In Compaq Computer, the taxpayer
entered into a dividend-stripping transaction that was carefully structured to generate tax
benefits that would shield from taxation the taxpayer's capital gain on an unrelated invest-
ment. 227 F.3d at 779-80. To achieve these benefits, the taxpayer purchased approxi-
mately $887 million of stock from a company that was about to issue a dividend. Id. at 780.
Significantly, the taxpayer purchased this $887 million of stock without any independent
inquiry into the value of the stock. Id. at 779-80. Less than one day after purchase, the
taxpayer received a gross dividend and sold the stock back to the seller for at an approxi-
mate $19 million loss. Id. at 780. After taking into account the transaction costs, the trans-
action generated a pre-tax profit of approximately $2 million, but this profit was nominal in
comparison to the substantial capital loss and the $887 million investment. Id. at 786. The
$2 million of profit was actually much smaller once the payment of foreign withholding
taxes on the dividend was taken into account. Id. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that this $2 million of pre-tax profit potential generated by the dividend-
stripping transaction indicated that the transactions at issue did not lack economic sub-
stance. Id.
218. For instance, a taxpayer recently attempted to fabricate evidence of a significant
business purpose after the taxpayer had already entered into the transaction in WFC Hold-
ings Corp. v. United States, Civ. No. 07-3320 (JRT/FLN), 2011 WL 4583817, at *33-36 (D.
Minn. Sept. 30, 2011). Although the court in this case recognized that the business pur-
poses was fabricated to conceal the true purpose of the transaction, it is likely that many
situations exist where the taxpayer successfully generates evidence of a non-tax purpose
that is accepted by the IRS or the court.
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this Article proposes that Congress amend Section 7701(o) to require evi-
dence that the arrangement's objective purpose is to defeat the intent and
purpose of the Internal Revenue Code or any of its provisions before
Section 7701(o) can strike down the transaction.
The results in several controversial cases would likely be different if the
courts had focused on whether the arrangement's objective purpose was
to defeat the intent and purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, rather
than on the taxpayer's subjective intent. For instance, in Frank Lyon Co.
v. United States, the taxpayer entered into a sale-leaseback transaction
with a bank. 219 The bank wanted to build a new building but could not
obtain conventional mortgage financing or regulatory approval to invest
in the building.220 Therefore, the bank entered into a sale-leaseback
transaction with the taxpayer where the taxpayer essentially financed the
building of the bank and also obtained depreciation and interest deduc-
tions.22 1 The U.S. Supreme Court held that the transaction was not abu-
sive under the economic substance doctrine partly because a subjective
business purpose to build a bank existed.222 However, this subjective
purpose should not have influenced the outcome of the case, because it is
not indicative of which transactions Congress intended to generate depre-
ciation and interest deductions.
On the other hand, if the objective evidence of the transaction's pur-
pose had been considered, the court would have more likely have charac-
terized the transaction as abusive. The objective evidence indicated that
the primary purpose of the sale-leaseback transaction was to generate de-
preciation deductions and other income tax benefits for the taxpayer to
incentivize the taxpayer to help the bank build a new building at a below-
market rate of return.223 The taxpayer was more akin to a lender, who is
not eligible for depreciation deductions, than the true economic owner of
the building.224 Because Congress intended for depreciation deductions
to be taken by owners of property and not lenders, the transaction likely
circumvented congressional intent.225 Thus, the tax benefits should have
been disallowed, notwithstanding the parties' subjective non-tax motives.
219. 435 U.S. 561, 564-65 (1978).
220. Id. at 563-64.
221. Id. at 564-65.
222. Id. at 583-84.
223. See Lederman, supra note 26, at 410-12. Specifically, to purchase the building, the
taxpayer invested $500,000 cash and took out a loan of approximately $7 million. Id. at
409. Pursuant to the arrangement, the investment generated a below-market rate of re-
turn. Id. at 410. To incentivize the taxpayer to enter into the arrangement and to make the
arrangement economically worthwhile, the transaction was structured so that the taxpayer
could obtain the income tax benefits of ownership. Id. at 410-12.
224. Id. at 410. The evidence indicated that the taxpayer did not have any economic
pre-tax profit potential, as a true owner should. Although the Supreme Court correctly
concluded that the taxpayer had an economic risk of loss, this risk of loss was the same risk
a lender would have had in this situation-the risk that the borrower would declare bank-
ruptcy and the value of the asset would be less than the taxpayer's loan balance at that
time. Id. at 411. Thus, this evidence further highlighted that the transaction purposefully
treated the taxpayer as an owner rather than a lender to generate tax benefits.
225. See I.R.C. § 167 (2006 & Supp. 2010).
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D. BURDEN OF PROOF
In the United States, the taxpayer, rather than the government, has the
burden of proving that a transaction has a meaningful economic effect
and a substantial non-tax purpose.226 Therefore, the United States has
not adopted the Canadian approach of placing an oppressive burden on
the government to prove the existence of an abusive transaction. The
American approach helps improve the effectiveness of Section 7701(o) by
enabling the IRS Commissioner to more easily apply Section 7701(o) to
tax abusive transactions and counteract the detrimental effects of tax
abuse.
However, placing the burden of proof on taxpayers creates a risk that
the Commissioner will over-apply Section 7701(o) and is potentially det-
rimental to Section 7701(o)'s goals. This risk is especially significant now,
because when Congress codified the economic substance doctrine it in-
cluded a harsh new penalty provision to accompany it.227 The new pen-
alty provision applies a strict liability penalty of 20% for disclosed
transactions that lack economic substance or fail to meet any similar eco-
nomic rule of law and a 40% understatement penalty for non-disclosed
transactions that lack economic substance or fail to meet any similar eco-
nomic rule of law.228 This means that no exceptions, including reasonable
cause or good faith, are available to a taxpayer who engages in a transac-
tion that is determined to lack economic substance.229 As a result, tax-
payers are under a lot of pressure to satisfy their burden of proof.
Both Congress and the IRS have taken steps to minimize the risk of the
Commissioner applying Section 7701(o) to legitimate tax planning trans-
actions. Specifically, the Joint Committee on Taxation, in its report relat-
ing to Section 7701(o), specifies a non-exclusive list of basic business
transactions to which Section 7701(o) should not apply. 230 This language
226. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. 2010); Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States,
454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2006) ("[W]hen the taxpayer claims a deduction, it is the
taxpayer who bears the burden of proving that the transaction has economic substance.").
227. See Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1409(b), (c)(1), 124 Stat. 1029, 1068-69.
228. I.R.C. §§ 6662(a), (b)(6), (i)(l), 6664(c). This new penalty provision not only ap-
plies when the economic substance doctrine is involved, but also when any other "similar
rule of law" applies. Id. § 6662(b)(6). It is unclear what other laws can trigger this strict
liability penalty. Many scholars agree that this new penalty provision is objectionable on
policy and other grounds and creates substantial vagueness and uncertainty in application.
See, e.g., Kathleen D. Thomas, The Case Against a Strict Liability Economic Substance
Penalty, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 445, 490 (2011); VanderWolk, supra note 113, at 548, 552.
229. See I.R.C. § 6664(c).
230. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 42, at 152-53. The report
also explains that: "[Section 7701(o)] is not intended to alter the tax treatment of certain
basic business transactions that, under longstanding judicial and administrative practice are
respected, merely because the choice between meaningful economic alternatives is largely
or entirely based on comparative tax advantages." Id. The immunized transactions in-
clude "(1) the choice between capitalizing a business enterprise with debt or equity; (2) a
U.S. person's choice between utilizing a foreign corporation or a domestic corporation to
make a foreign investment; (3) the choice to enter a transaction or series of transactions
that constitute a corporate organization or reorganization under subchapter C; and (4) the
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helps ensure that Section 7701(o) will not be applied to alter the tax treat-
ment of these non-abusive transactions.
The IRS has refused to promulgate an "angel list" of other immunized
transactions. 231 However, the IRS has acted to mitigate the risk of over-
applying Section 7701(o) and imposing the corresponding significant pen-
alty on legitimate transactions by requiring all examiners and managers
to obtain the approval of the appropriate Director of Field Operations
within the IRS prior to applying Section 7701(o).232 The IRS has also
recently issued internal guidance to its examiners and managers that sets
forth the procedures examiners and their managers must undertake
before seeking approval to apply the economic substance doctrine.2 33
These measures may help prevent the Commissioner from substantially
over-applying Section 7701(o) and achieve more uniformity at the agency
level. However, this IRS guidance is not an official pronouncement of
law, and cannot be used, cited, or relied upon as such.234 Thus, the extent
to which the IRS and the courts will apply Section 7701(o) to transactions
remains to be seen. If there is fear of undue uncertainty or excessive
litigation, Congress should hone the application of Section 7701(o) by sin-
gling out certain objective factors and making them determinative of the
matter as it has done in other laws. It should also promulgate a list of
additional transactions that are immunized from Section 7701(o) and re-
peal the strict liability penalty because it exacerbates the uncertainty and
unpredictability inherent in Section 7701(o).235
choice to utilize a related-party entity in a transaction, provided that the arm's length stan-
dard of section 482 and other applicable concepts are satisfied." Id. (footnotes omitted).
231. IRS Notice 2010-62, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411, 412 (Oct. 4, 2010).
232. IRS, LMSB-20-0910-024, CODIFICATION OF ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCTRINE
AND RELATED PENALTIES (Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/arti-
cle/0,,id=242254,00.html.
233. IRS, LB&I-4-0711-015, GUIDANCE FOR EXAMINERS AND MANAGERS ON THE
CODIFIED ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE DOCrRINE AND RELATED PENALTIES (July 15, 2011),
available at http://www.irs.govlbusinesses/article /0,,id=242253,00.html. Specifically, the Di-
rective sets out four steps that an examiner must undertake prior to seeking approval to
apply the doctrine. First, an examiner must evaluate specified facts and circumstances to
determine whether the doctrine is not appropriate in that instance. Id. If the examiner
believes factors indicate that the doctrine may be appropriate, then the examiner must
continue to the second step and analyze whether the circumstances in the case show the
application of the economic substance doctrine may be appropriate. Id. The Directive lists
out certain facts and circumstances that the examiner should consider when performing
this analysis. Id. Third, if after applying the guidance in the first two steps, the examiner
believes the economic substance doctrine may apply, then the examiner must answer a
series of inquiries that are set forth in the Directive. Id. Finally, if the examiner, in consul-
tation with his manager and territory manager, determine that it is appropriate to seek
approval of the Director of Field Operations, the Directive provides guidance on how to
seek approval. Id.
234. See id; IRS, LMSB-20-0910-024, supra note 232.
235. As other scholars have argued, the strict liability nature of the penalty is also un-
fair and disproportionate. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Hill & Alexandra Minkovich, Tax Policy
Gone Wild: Harsh Penalties as Revenue Raisers, 115 TAx NOTES 79, 80-82 (2007); Thomas,
supra note 228, at 445 (arguing that "the new penalty adds significant and undue complex-
ity to the current [penalty] regime"). For an in-depth discussion of the criticisms of the
strict liability penalty, see Thomas, supra note 228.
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E. IDENTIFYING THE RELEVANT SCHEME
In addition, Section 7701(o) contemplates that the economic substance
doctrine can apply to disallow tax benefits arising from individual steps
within a larger transaction.236 As the international experience indicates,
inserting an element lacking in business purpose and economic effect into
an overall legitimate transaction should not shield a transaction from a
GAAR. Thus, courts that are willing to disaggregate transactions and
apply Section 7701(o) to the specific transaction that generates the al-
leged tax benefit improve Section 7701(o)'s effectiveness at identifying
and countering tax abuse in the United States.
Recent U.S. case law also demonstrates the importance of disaggregat-
ing abusive transactions from the overall arrangement when applying
Section 7701(o). For instance, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
overruled the district court's decision in Sala v. United States that a tax-
payer's $60 million loss-generating foreign currency options transaction
should be respected.237 The district court failed to separately consider
the taxpayer's investment in a "Son of BOSS" tax shelter transaction, 238
which was bundled with a legitimate investment activity.2 39 The "Son of
BOSS" transaction enabled the taxpayer to artificially inflate his basis in
a newly formed partnership and, therefore, generate substantial losses
upon the subsequent pre-determined partnership liquidation and sale of
the partnership assets.240
However, by focusing on the taxpayer's entire investment activities,
rather than the individual activities, the district court incorrectly found
the abusive transaction had economic effect and business purpose. The
district court reached this conclusion despite the evidence that indicated
the loss-generating investment activity was abusive. Specifically, the evi-
dence showed that the taxpayer suffered no actual economic harm, the
236. The legislative history explains that the enactment of Section 7701(o) does not
change the court's ability to aggregate, disaggregate, or otherwise re-characterize a transac-
tion when applying the doctrine. Section 7701(o) merely reiterates the courts' ability
under present law to bifurcate a transaction in which independent activities with business
objectives are combined with an unrelated item having only tax-avoidance purpose in or-
der to disallow the tax benefits arising from the tax-motivated item. STAFF OF THE JOINT
COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 42, at 153.
237. 613 F.3d 1249, 1250 (10th Cir. 2010).
238. A "Son of BOSS" transaction is a "sales option bond strategy" that has been iden-
tified as abusive by the IRS. See IRS Notice 2000-44, 2000-36 I.R.B. 254, 255. Under this
type of transaction, a taxpayer generates losses by artificially inflating the basis of partner-
ship interests. The taxpayer typically then sells the partnership interest (or an asset that
derives its tax basis from the partnership interest) for a substantial loss, which the taxpayer
uses to shelter income from other sources. Through this strategy, the taxpayer is able to
generate a sizeable loss deduction without incurring a corresponding economic loss. See id.
239. Sala v. United States, 613 F.3d 1249, 1252 (10th Cir. 2010).
240. Id. In Sala, the taxpayer's wholly owned S-corporation contributed foreign cur-
rency options to a partnership. Id. at 1251. The taxpayer disregarded the value of the
short options when calculating his basis in the partnership under a then-existing tax rule
that disregarded short options as liabilities for purposes of establishing partnership basis.
Id. at 1253. By increasing his basis in the partnership, the taxpayer was able to generate
tax losses when the partnership liquidated after a few weeks and the taxpayer sold the
partnership assets. Id. at 1252.
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transaction was designed primarily to create a fictional loss, and the tax-
payer did not contest that the tax loss was wholly artificial.241 Even
though the statute was silent about any economic substance requirement
in this context, it is clear that Congress would not have intended for a
taxpayer to benefit from a fictional loss at the expense of the govern-
ment.242 Thus, as both the international experience with GAARs and the
U.S. tax abuse jurisprudence have shown, courts should focus on the par-
ticular transactions that generate the alleged tax benefit, not on secon-
dary transactions that do not give rise to the tax benefits when applying a
GAAR or a GAAR-like statute. Determining and evaluating the correct
"transaction" is a critical aspect of effectively applying the economic sub-
stance doctrine to distinguish the abusive transactions from the legitimate
ones. 243
VI. CONCLUSION
Tax planning is an important part of our society. Although some tax
benefits are specifically enacted to encourage taxpayers to engage in a
particular behavior for policy or other reasons, not all tax minimizing
transactions should be respected. There is a difference between legiti-
mate tax planning and unacceptable tax abuse. The latter types of trans-
actions are detrimental to the efficiency and fairness of our tax system
and to our society as a whole. Thus, it is essential for governments to
target tax abusive transactions and minimize these detrimental effects.
Countries worldwide often use similarly worded GAARs to address
this common and costly tax abuse problem. The United States recently
joined these countries by enacting a GAAR-like statute in Section
7701(o) of the Code. The international experience with GAARs shows
that, if used correctly, Section 7701(o) can significantly help minimize the
negative effects of tax abuse in the United States. By rejecting the Duke
of Westminster principle and adopting other judicial approaches that have
strengthened GAARs abroad, U.S. courts will likely increase Section
7701(o)'s strength as an anti-abuse weapon.
However, the United States judiciary has also taken several approaches
that potentially render Section 7701(o) ineffective or create substantial
uncertainty for taxpayers. Thus, Congress and the Treasury should take
steps to remedy this situation and thereby bolster Section 7701(o)'s effec-
tiveness and improve the economic efficiency and fairness of our tax sys-
tem. Although Section 7701(o) is not a universal cure to the tax abuse
problem in the United States, for Section 7701(o) to truly be an effective
weapon in the fight against tax abuse, the judiciary, legislature, and tax
241. Id. at 1253-54.
242. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that tax advantages must be
linked to actual losses to be within Congress's contemplation. See id. at 1253; Keeler v.
Comm'r, 243 F.3d 1212, 1218 (10th Cir. 2001).
243. Lederman, supra note 26, at 417-18.
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administration must all work together.244
244. See Evans, supra note 11, at 37.
